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In 1994, after decades of inequality and oppression, South Africa ushered in a new age of 
democracy with the help of its interim and final Constitutions. At the core of these 
Constitutions stand the values of human dignity, equality and freedom. In order to give effect 
to these values, Parliament has passed a wide range of statutes over the past 25 years. Perhaps 
the most significant of these is the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (the ‘Equality Act’).  
 
As its short title clearly indicates, the purpose of this Act is, inter alia, to promote equality 
and to prevent unfair discrimination. Insofar as the second goal is concerned, however, the 
short title is misleading. This is because a careful examination of the Equality Act shows that 
its purpose is not simply to prevent unfair discrimination, but also to prevent, prohibit and 
eliminate hate speech and harassment.  
 
In order to achieve these various goals, the Equality Act makes provision for a new specialist 
court, namely the Equality Court. Apart from conferring the power on the Court to determine 
whether an act of unfair discrimination, hate speech or harassment has been committed, the 
Equality Act also confers a wide range of remedial powers on it. These remedial powers, 
which are set out in section 21, are varied in nature. While some look backwards and focus 
on remedying the individual harm suffered, others look forward and focus on preventing a 
recurrence of the harmful conduct. 
 
Despite being able to draw on such a wide range of remedies, an examination of the reported 
and unreported judgments of the Equality Court indicates that in the overwhelming majority 
of cases, the Court has relied on three in particular, namely interdicts, damages and 
unconditional apologies. The aim of this thesis is to set out and critically discuss the manner 
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CHAPTER ONE: BACKGROUND AND OUTLINE OF RESEARCH PROBLEM 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
Although the Constitution1 recognises, protects and promotes a wide range of fundamental 
human rights, it can be argued that one of the most important of these is the right to equality. 
The reason for this is not difficult to find. The system of apartheid and its policy of racial 
discrimination deprived black South Africans of their human dignity, dispossessed them of 
their land and other resources and excluded them from the processes and systems of 
government.2 The individual humiliation, economic and social hardship and legal and 
political exclusion black South Africans suffered during the apartheid era exerted an 
enormous influence on the drafters of the Constitution, who sought, not only to prohibit racial 
discrimination, but also to address its ongoing consequences.  
 
The prominent role that equality plays in the Constitution is illustrated partly by the fact that 
it is the first substantive right guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which is itself described as the 
cornerstone of our democracy. Section 9 of the Constitution thus provides that: 
 
(1)  Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law. 
(2)  Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the achievement 
of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of 
persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken. 
(3)  The state may not discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including 
race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, 
disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth. 
(4)  No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds in 
terms of subsection (3). National legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair 
discrimination. 
(5)  Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it is established
 that the discrimination is fair. 
 
Section 9 of the Bill of Rights is an all-encompassing equality right which upholds 
substantive equality as essential to our democracy. Substantive equality refers to equality in 
                                                            
1 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Hereafter the ‘Constitution’. 
2 C Albertyn, B Goldblatt & C Roederer Introduction to the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (2002) 1.  
2 
 
social and economic life and recognises that inequality is not only caused by differential 
treatment but also ‘emerges from systemic group based inequalities that shape relations of 
dominance and subordination and material disparities between groups’.3 To achieve 
substantive equality, section 9 further provides that national legislation must be enacted to 
prevent unfair discrimination. In response to this, the Promotion of Equality and Prevention 
of Unfair Discrimination Act4 (the ‘Equality Act’) has been passed as a legislative tool to 
promote and fulfil the equality right.5 
 




The Equality Act is the national legislation required by section 9(4) of the Constitution, and 
therefore enjoys special constitutional prominence.6 The long title of the Act,7 together with 
the objects clause,8 indicate that it Act has two main goals. The first is to promote equality 
and the second is to prevent, prohibit and eliminate unfair discrimination, hate speech and 
harassment.9 The Act thus places a positive duty and responsibility, not only on the state, but 
also on civil society, traditional institutions and all persons to promote equality.10 
 
In order to achieve these various goals, the Equality Act makes provision for a new specialist 
court, namely the Equality Court. Apart from conferring the power on this Court to determine 
whether an act of unfair discrimination, hate speech or harassment has been committed, the 
Act also confers a wide range of remedial powers on it. These remedial powers – which are 
set out in section 21(2) of the Act – are varied in nature. This is in accordance with the 
                                                            
3 C Albertyn, B Goldblatt & C Roederer Introduction to the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (2002) 2. 
4 Act 4 of 2000. 
5 C Albertyn, B Goldblatt & C Roederer Introduction to the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (2002) 3. 
6 It also fulfils certain of South Africa's international treaty obligations. 
7 The long title reads as follows: ‘To give effect to section 9 read with item 23 (1) of Schedule 6 to the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, so as to prevent and prohibit unfair discrimination and 
harassment; to promote equality and eliminate unfair discrimination; to prevent and prohibit hate speech; and to 
provide for matters connected therewith’. 
8 Section 2.  
9 Preamble of the Equality Act. 




guiding principles set out in section 4(1)(d) of the Act which provide that corrective or 
restorative measures must be used in conjunction with deterrent measures.  
 
In light of these principles, it is not surprising that some of the remedies set out in section 
21(2) look backwards and focus on remedying the harm suffered by the victim, while others 
look forward and focus on preventing a recurrence of the harmful conduct by the wrongdoer. 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the nature and the purpose of these remedies as 
well as the manner in which the Equality Court has selected, interpreted and applied them in 
light of the aims and objects of the Equality Act.  
 
Before turning to discuss the Equality Court and its remedial powers in more detail, however, 
it will be helpful to discuss briefly the manner in which the Equality Act regulates unfair 
discrimination, hate speech and harassment.  
 




Section 6 of the Equality Act provides that ‘[n]either the state nor any person may unfairly 
discriminate against any person’.11 The concept of discrimination is defined very widely in 
section 1 of the Act as ‘[a]ny act or omission, including a policy, law, rule, practice, 
condition or situation which directly or indirectly: (a) imposes burdens, obligations or 
disadvantage on; or (b) withholds benefits, opportunities or advantages from, any person on 
one or more of the prohibited grounds’.12 
 
The ‘prohibited grounds’ referred to in paragraph (b) are also defined in section 1 of the Act. 
Section 1(1)(xxiii)(a) provides in this respect that the prohibited grounds are ‘race, gender, 
sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, 
disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language, birth and HIV/AIDS status’.13 
 
                                                            
11 Fair discrimination is permitted in law. Tests have been developed to determine whether the discrimination 
can be regarded as fair in an open and democratic society. This will be explored further in the thesis.  
12 Section 1(1)(viii). 
13 HIV/AIDS status was included in the list of prohibited grounds following the enactment of the Judicial 
Matters Amendment Act 8 of 2017.  
4 
 
Apart from these enumerated grounds, section 1(1)(xxiii)(b) of the Equality Act goes on to 
provide that the prohibited grounds also include ‘any other ground where discrimination 
based on that other ground: 
(i)  causes or perpetuates systemic disadvantage; 
(ii)  undermines human dignity; or 
(iii)  adversely affects the equal enjoyment of a person’s rights and freedoms in a serious 
manner that is comparable to discrimination on a ground in paragraph (a)’. 
 
Albertyn et al argue that the definition of unfair discrimination may be reduced to three 
essential elements. These are as follows: 
• there must be a direct/indirect act or omission, 
• which causes harm (either by imposing a burden or withholding a benefit), 
• on a prohibited ground.14  
 
Whilst the Equality Act lists many prohibited grounds, for the purposes of this thesis we will 




Historically, race has been the primary source of inequality in South Africa.15 Apart from 
gender and disability, it is not surprising, therefore, that the Equality Act regulates unfair 
discrimination on the ground of race in much greater detail than any of the other prohibited 
grounds. 
 
Unfair racial discrimination, therefore, is prohibited, not only in section 6 of the Equality Act, 
but also in section 7. Besides repeating the general prohibition against unfair racial 
discrimination in section 6, section 7 also identifies and prohibits certain specific forms of 
racial discrimination. These specific forms are as follows: 
 
                                                            
14 C Albertyn, B Goldblatt & C Roederer Introduction to the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (2002) 33. 
15 C Albertyn, B Goldblatt & C Roederer Introduction to the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (2002) 56. 
5 
 
‘(a)  the dissemination of any propaganda or idea, which propounds the racial superiority or inferiority of 
any person, including incitement to, or participation in, any form of racial violence;16 
(b)  the engagement in any activity which is intended to promote, or has the effect of promoting, 
exclusivity, based on race;17 
(c)  the exclusion of persons of a particular race group under any rule or practice that appears to be 
legitimate but which is actually aimed at maintaining exclusive control by a particular race group;18  
(d)  the provision or continued provision of inferior services to any race group, compared to those of 
another ace group;19 
(e)  the denial of access to opportunities, including access to services or contractual opportunities for 





Apart from race, gender has been another important source of inequality in South Africa. 
Like unfair discrimination on the ground of race, therefore, unfair discrimination on the 
grounds of gender is also prohibited, not only in section 6 of the Equality Act, but also in 
section 8.  
 
Like section 7 of the Equality Act, section 8 also repeats the general prohibition against 
unfair discrimination on the grounds of gender in section 6 of the Equality Act and then goes 
on to identify and prohibit specific forms of unfair gender discrimination. These specific 
forms are as follows: 
 
‘(a)  gender-based violence; 
(b)  female genital mutilation; 
(c)  the system of preventing women from inheriting family property; 
(d)  any practice, including traditional, customary or religious practice, which impairs the dignity of women 
and undermines equality between women and men, including the undermining of the dignity and well-
being of the girl child; 
(e)  any policy or conduct that unfairly limits access of women to land rights, finance, and other resources; 
(f)  discrimination on the ground of pregnancy; 
(g)  limiting women’s access to social services or benefits, such as health, education and social security; 
                                                            
16 Section 7(a). 
17 Section 7(b). 
18 Section 7(c). 
19 Section 7(d). 
20 Section 7(e). 
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(h)  the denial of access to opportunities, including access to services or contractual opportunities for 
rendering services for consideration, or failing to take steps to reasonably accommodate the needs of 
such persons; 
(i)  systemic inequality of access to opportunities by women as a result of the sexual division of labour’. 
 
(d) Sexual orientation 
 
Unlike unfair discrimination on the grounds of race and gender, unfair discrimination on the 
ground of sexual orientation is not singled out for additional treatment by the Equality Act. 
Instead, sexual orientation is simply included in the list of prohibited grounds defined in 
section 1(a) of the Equality Act.  
 
In other words, while the Equality Act does prohibit unfair discrimination on the grounds of 
sexual orientation in section 6, it does not go on to repeat this general prohibition in a 
separate section and neither does it identify and prohibit specific forms of unfair 
discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation.  
 
Despite the fact that sexual orientation is not singled out for additional treatment, the decision 
to include it as a prohibited ground, initially in the Constitution and, subsequently, in the 
Equality Act is significant. This is because South Africa was the first country in the world to 
put an end to discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.21  
 
South Africa is also a signatory to the 2008 United Nations Human Rights Council 
Resolution on Sexual Orientation and Gender22 and has committed internationally, 
constitutionally and domestically to root out the scourge of unfair discrimination against 
Lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, queer and intersex (LGBTQIAP+) groups.23  
 
                                                            
21 Section 9(3). 
22 Adopted on 17 June 2011. 
23 TJ Powys ‘Benefit or impediment?: The operation of the Equality Courts in South Africa’ (2016) 30(1) 
Agenda 37. 
23 Section 16 of the Judicial Matters Amendment Act. 
7 
 
Furthermore, South Africa made world headlines when it allowed the conclusion of a civil 
union/partnership irrespective of the sex of the parties.24 The Civil Union Act25came into 
effect one year after the delivery of judgment and resulted in South Africa becoming the fifth 
country in the world to legislate same sex marriages.26 
 
Even with these advancements, challenges to the realisation of the right to equality of sexual 
minorities remain.27 These include the systemic unfair discrimination against people whose 
sexual orientation is not specifically or expressly recognised and represented in many local 
languages and persistent criminal hate speech and acts against lesbians, gays, bisexuals, 
transgender, intersex, asexual and pansexual persons.28 
 
1.2.3 Hate speech 
 
While unfair discrimination is prohibited in section 6 of the Equality Act, hate speech is 
prohibited in section 10. This section reads as follows:  
 
‘(1)  Subject to the proviso in section 12, no person may publish, propagate, advocate or communicate 
words based on one or more of the prohibited grounds, against any person, that could reasonably be 
construed to demonstrate a clear intention to: 
(a) be hurtful; 
(b)  be harmful or to incite harm; 
(c)  promote or propagate hatred. 
 
(2)  Without prejudice to any remedies of a civil nature under this Act, the court may, in accordance 
with section 21 (2) (n) and where appropriate, refer any case dealing with the publication, advocacy, 
propagation or communication of hate speech as contemplated in subsection (1), to the Director of 
Public Prosecutions having jurisdiction for the institution of criminal proceedings in terms of the 
common law or relevant legislation’. 
 
                                                            
24 Minister of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie and Another; Lesbian and Gay Equality Project and Eighteen 
Others v Minister of Home Affairs 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC). See also TJ Powys ‘Benefit or impediment?: The 
operation of the Equality Courts in South Africa’(2016) 30(1) Agenda 36-48. 
25 Act 17 of 2006. 
26 See TJ Powys ‘Benefit or impediment?: The operation of the Equality Courts in South Africa’ (2016) 30(1) 
Agenda 36 37 for a more detailed discussion.  
27 South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) ‘Equality roundtable dialogue’ (2014). Available at 
https://www.sahrc.org.za/home/21/files/Equality%20Roundtable%20Dialogue%20Report.pdf, accessed on 04 
February 2019.  
28 Ibid. Hereafter referred to as ‘LGBTQIAP+’.  
8 
 
Section 10 must be read with section 12 which prohibits the dissemination and publication of 
information that unfairly discriminates. This section reads as follows:  
 
‘No person may: 
(a) disseminate or broadcast any information; 
(b) publish or display any advertisement or notice, 
that could reasonably be construed or reasonably be understood to demonstrate a clear intention to unfairly 
discriminate against any person: Provided that bona fide engagement in artistic creativity, academic and 
scientific inquiry, fair and accurate reporting in the public interest or publication of any information, 
advertisement or notice in accordance with section 16 of the Constitution, is not precluded by this section.’ 
 
Although hate speech is not defined in the Act, its meaning is determinable with reference to 
the objects of the Act when read together with section 10 and the section 12 proviso.29 Kruger 
argues in this respect that hate speech may be defined as ‘a form of expression that exceeds 
the bounds of acceptable expression in a democratic and open society because it does not 
further the goals of free expression and because it infringes unjustifiably upon the right to 




Harassment is prohibited in section 11 of the Equality Act which states simply that ‘[n]o 
person may subject any person to harassment’. Harassment itself is defined in section 1 of the 
Act as ‘unwanted conduct which is persistent or serious and demeans, humiliates or creates a 
hostile or intimidating environment or is calculated to induce submission by actual or 
threatened adverse consequences and which is related to: 
(a)  sex, gender or sexual orientation; or 
(b)  a person’s membership or presumed membership of a group identified by one or more 
of the prohibited grounds or a characteristic associated with such group’.31 
 
                                                            
29 C Albertyn, B Goldblatt & C Roederer Introduction to the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (2002) 90. Albertyn et al. also state that Article 4 of the International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1966 can be used to define the concept.  
30 R Kruger Racism and law: Implementing the right to equality in selected South African equality courts 
(Unpublished Thesis, Rhodes University, 2008) 162. 
31 Section 1(1)(xiii).  
9 
 
As Kruger points out, the Equality Act is unique as it distinguishes harassment from unfair 
discrimination and views it as a ‘social ill that exists alongside unfair discrimination’.32 
 
Like the definition of unfair discrimination, Albertyn et al argue that the definition of 
harassment may be reduced to three essential elements. These are as follows:  
• unwanted persistent or serious conduct,  
• which negatively impacts a person, 
• and is related to the one of the prohibited grounds.33 
 
Finally, it is important to note that unfairness plays no role as harassment can never be fair.34  
 




As pointed out above, the Equality Act does not simply prohibit unfair discrimination, hate 
speech and harassment. In addition, it also creates an alternative system of courts, namely the 
Equality Courts.  
 
The Equality Act provides in this respect that all High Courts are automatically designated as 
Equality Courts, but more importantly affords the bulk of adjudicative powers relating to 
equality matters to the Magistrate’s Courts.35 The Department of Justice designates 
Magistrate’s Courts as having jurisdiction to entertain equality matters once presiding 
officers and staff of such Courts receive the appropriate training.36  
 
The purpose of the Equality Courts is to resolve matters specifically relating to unfair 
discrimination, hate speech and harassment, with a view toward removing the social and 
                                                            
32 R Kruger Racism and law: Implementing the right to equality in selected South African equality courts 
(Unpublished Thesis, Rhodes University, 2008) 176. 
33 C Albertyn, B Goldblatt & C Roederer Introduction to the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (2002) 99. This has been accepted as the elements of harassment by Kruger (see R 
Kruger Racism and law: Implementing the right to equality in selected South African equality courts 
(Unpublished Thesis, Rhodes University, 2008) 174-181). 
34 C Albertyn, B Goldblatt & C Roederer Introduction to the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (2002) 98. 
35 Section 10.  
36 Ibid.  
10 
 
economic inequalities which were generated in the country’s history of colonialism, apartheid 
and patriarchy.37 The operation of the Equality Courts, therefore, is intrinsic to the 
functioning of the Equality Act. 
 
Although the decision to create a new system of Equality Courts was based on several 
grounds, one the most important is the fact that access to justice is severely limited in South 
Africa as a result of a number of factors. These factors include the geographic location of 
courts, the physical inaccessibility of courts, the lack of knowledge of rights, procedural 
hurdles, the intimidating nature of the courts, and the cost of litigation.38 
 
In order to address the factors, the drafters of the Equality Act included a number of 
provisions in the Act aimed at facilitating access to the Equality Courts. Among these are the 
fact that lawyers are not needed in Equality Courts, although their use is not banned. Also, 
unlike many South African courts, no fees are required to place a case before an Equality 
Court. Originally, Equality Courts were intended to be located in all Magistrate Court 





Apart from the aforementioned innovative steps, the Equality Act also contains an unusually 
long and open list of remedies that may be utilised by the Equality Courts. These remedies 
are set out in section 21 of the Act. This section reads as follows:  
 
‘(2)  After holding an inquiry, the court may make an appropriate order in the circumstances, including: 
(a) an interim order; 
(b) a declaratory order; 
(c)  an order making a settlement between the parties to the proceedings an order of court; 
                                                            
37 Preamble of the Equality Act. 
38 M Nyenti ‘Access to justice in the South African social security: Towards a conceptual approach’ (2013) 44 
De Jure 911 and D Kaersvang ‘Equality Courts in South Africa: Legal Access for the Poor’ (2008) 15(2) The 
Journal of the International Institute 4. Available at https://quod.lib.umich.edu/j/jii/4750978.0015.203/--
equality-courts-in-south-africa-legal-access-for-the-poor?rgn=main;view=fulltext, accessed on 30 January 2019. 
See also C Albertyn, B Goldblatt & C Roederer Introduction to the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of 
Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (2002) 5 and W Holness ‘Barriers to advocacy and litigation in the equality 
courts for persons with disabilities’ (2014) 7(5) PER 1907. Available at http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/pelj.v17i5.04, 
accessed on 04 February 2019. 
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(d)  an order for the payment of any damages in respect of any proven financial loss, including 
future loss, or in respect of impairment of dignity, pain and suffering or emotional and 
psychological suffering, as a result of the unfair discrimination, hate speech or harassment in 
question; 
(e)  after hearing the views of the parties or, in the absence of the respondent, the views of the 
complainant in the matter, an order for the payment of damages in the form of an award to an 
appropriate body or organisation; 
(f) an order restraining unfair discriminatory practices or directing that specific steps be taken to 
stop the unfair discrimination, hate speech or harassment; 
(g)  an order to make specific opportunities and privileges unfairly denied in the circumstances, 
available to the complainant in question; 
(h) an order for the implementation of special measures to address the unfair discrimination, hate 
speech or harassment in question; 
(i) an order directing the reasonable accommodation of a group or class of persons by the 
respondent; 
(j) an order that an unconditional apology be made; 
(k) an order requiring the respondent to undergo an audit of specific policies or practices as 
determined by the court; 
(l) an appropriate order of a deterrent nature, including the recommendation to the appropriate 
authority, to suspend or revoke the licence of a person; 
(m) a directive requiring the respondent to make regular progress reports to the court or to the 
relevant constitutional institution regarding the implementation of the court’s order; 
(n) an order directing the clerk of the equality court to submit the matter to the Director of Public 
Prosecutions having jurisdiction for the possible institution of criminal proceedings in terms 
of the common law or relevant legislation; 
(o) an appropriate order of costs against any party to the proceedings; 
(p) an order to comply with any provision of the Act. 
 
(3)  An order made by an equality court in terms of or under this Act has the effect of an order of the said 
court made in a civil action, where appropriate. 
 
(4)  The court may, during or after an inquiry, refer:  
(a) its concerns in any proceedings before it, particularly in the case of persistent contravention or 
failure to comply with a provision of this Act or in the case of systemic unfair discrimination, 
hate speech or harassment to any relevant constitutional institution for further investigation; 
(b) any proceedings before it to any relevant constitutional institution or appropriate body for 
mediation, conciliation or negotiation. 
 
(5)  The court has all ancillary powers necessary or reasonably incidental to the performance of its 




In her thesis, Hellum argues that this wide range of remedies invites the Equality Courts to be 
creative and encourages it to play an active role in ensuring that appropriate measures are 
taken to uphold the objectives of the Equality Act and eradicate unfair discrimination, hate 
speech and harassment.39 Unfortunately, Hellum argues further, an examination of the case 
law shows that the Equality Court has failed to utilise most of the remedies listed in section 
21 of the Act. Instead, it has limited itself largely to three remedies in particular, namely ‘an 
unconditional apology’, ‘interim orders’ and the ‘payment of damages’.40  
 
1.4 The research question 
 
As pointed out above, Hellum argues that even though the Equality Act provides for a wide 
range of remedies, an examination of the case law shows that the Equality Court has limited 
itself largely to three in particular, namely ‘an unconditional apology’, ‘interim orders’ and 
the ‘payment of damages’. This somewhat surprising and disappointing finding gives rise to a 
number of complex and difficult questions. Among these are the following: 
• First, what is the nature and purpose of the section 21(2) remedies? 
• Second, which of the section 21(2) remedies are most commonly utilised by the 
Equality Courts? 
• Third, how have the Equality Courts interpreted and applied the section 21(2) 
remedies they are utilising?  
• Fourth, what are the implications of the Equality Courts’ remedial jurisprudence for 
the aims and objects of the Equality Act? 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the nature and purpose of the section 21(2) 
remedies and to critically analyse the remedial jurisprudence of the Equality Courts in light of 
the aims and objects of the Equality Act.  
 
More specifically the purpose of this thesis is to: 
• set out and discuss the nature and purpose of the remedies listed in section 21(2) of 
the Equality Act; 
                                                            
39 A Hellum Equality rights and democratic transition: Study of cases in South Africa’s Equality Courts 
(Unpublished Thesis, University of Oslo, 2006) 49.  
40 Ibid.  
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• set out and discuss the manner in which the Equality Courts have selected, interpreted 
and applied the section 21(2) remedies; and 
• critically analyse the remedial jurisprudence of the Equality Court and evaluate the 
implications of this jurisprudence for the aims and objects of the Equality Act. 
 
1.5 The purpose of the thesis 
 
Despite the enactment and implementation of the Equality Act, discrimination in South 
Africa remains deeply embedded in practices and attitudes. This is evident from the 
continuing scourge of equality cases that are reported in the media and cases that are brought 
before the courts by marginalised groups such as women, the LGBTQIAP+41 community, 
foreign nationals and the urban and rural poor.42 
 
This thesis critically assesses the extent to which the Equality Act is achieving its goals 
whilst identifying any shortfalls within the legislation. Further, it assesses the Equality Courts 
as an instrument of the Act and, in particular, it focuses on the interpretation and 
implementation of the section 21(2) remedies by the Equality Courts. A critical assessment of 
a body of Equality Court cases will be conducted in pursuit of such information.43  
 
Essentially, the thesis seeks to update the current academic literature available on the topic 
whilst fuelling the available information on remedial measures granted to the Equality 
Courts.  
 
1.6 The research methodology 
 
The thesis is a product of doctrinal research in the form of a ‘gap study’.  
 
The methodology used was a purely doctrinal approach of the law. The essential features of 
doctrinal scholarship involve ‘a critical conceptual analysis of all relevant legislation and case 
                                                            
41 Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender/Transsexual, Queer/Questioning, Intersex/Inclusive, Asexual/Ally, 
Pansexual.  
42 See generally TJ Powys ‘Benefit or impediment?: The operation of the Equality Courts in South Africa’ 
(2016) 30(1) Agenda 36. 
43 Focusing on a High Court level.  
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law to reveal a statement of the law relevant to the matter under investigation’.44 Doctrinal 
research is characterised by the study of legal texts and is often colloquially described as 
‘black-letter law’.45 Information was gathered from a variety of sources including textbooks, 
refereed journals, conference papers, media article, case law and legislation. 
 
The thesis used doctrinal methodology to gain deeper understanding into the Act and its 
courts and present relevant findings as to the deficiencies of such. An analysis of a select 
body of Equality Court cases was conducted46 to specifically highlight the approach by the 
Equality Courts in relation to remedies for cases of unfair discrimination, hate speech and 
harassment. The thesis also seeks to clarify the persistent challenges to the advancement of 
the right to equality in South Africa and propose workable improvements in light of the 
objectives of the legislation.  
 
1.7 The structure of the thesis 
 
Chapter One: Background and outline of the thesis 
 
The background of this thesis is set out in Chapter One. Apart from the background, the 
research question, the research methodology, the structure of the thesis and the limitation of 
the thesis are also set out in Chapter One.  
 
Chapter Two: Historical background 
 
Some of the key features of the apartheid system are set out and discussed in Chapter One. 
Besides the key features of apartheid, the transition from apartheid to democracy is also set 




                                                            
44 TC Hutchinson ‘Valé Bunny Watson? Law librarians, law libraries, and legal research in the post-internet era’ 
(2014) 106(4) Law Library Journal 584. 
45 P Chynoweth ‘Legal research in the built environment: A methodological framework’ (2008). Available at 
http://usir.salford.ac.uk/12467/1/legal_research.pdf, accessed on 01 February 2019.  
46 The analysis will be conducted using a list of questions devised as a test by the writer to objectively assess the 
approach taken by the courts in relation to remedies.  
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Chapter Three: The Equality Act  
 
The aims and objects of the Equality Act are set out in Chapter Two. In addition, the statutory 
provisions prohibiting unfair discrimination, hate speech and harassment are also set out and 
discussed in this Chapter.   
 
Chapter Four: The Equality Court 
 
The structure and jurisdiction of the Equality Court are set out in Chapter Three. Apart from 
the structure and jurisdiction of the Equality Court, the presiding and other officers of the 
Equality Court are also set out and discussed in this chapter 
 
Chapter Five: Section 21(2) remedies 
 
The manner in which the courts have interpreted and applied section 21(2) of the Equality 
Act is set out and discussed in Chapter Five. This analysis is also located in a discussion of 
the types of remedies recognised in the South African legal system and the manner in which 
remedies can be classified. 
  
Chapter Six: Recommendations and conclusion 
 
This chapter provides a general overview of the recommendations identified within the thesis 
in order to support the efficient functioning of the Equality Act and its tools. 
 
1.8 Limitations and delimitations 
 
The thesis was limited in scope as it does not include other transformation Acts47 beyond the 
realm and discussion of the Equality Act. The thesis focuses exclusively on the Equality Act 
as it has been described as ‘the most important Act to have been passed by the South African 
Parliament second only to the Constitution’.48 The Act deals with the promotion of equality 
                                                            
47 In the legislative sphere, the following Acts have been passed, among others: Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowerment Act 53 of 2003, Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 
1997 and the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. 
48 AJ Kok A socio-legal analysis of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 
2000 (Unpublished thesis, University of Pretoria, 2007) 28. 
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by state and non-state entities, prevention of unfair discrimination, harassment and hate 
speech. This thesis, however, only focuses on three grounds of unfair discrimination (race, 
gender and sexual orientation), hate speech and harassment. 
 
The thesis covers a discussion of the Equality Courts as a cog of the Equality Act whilst 
providing specific attention to the section 21(2) remedies of the Court. In conducting the 
analysis, only desktop research was carried out as the scope and scale of the thesis did not 
allow interaction with litigants, court officials or other personnel. In relying on the intended 
method of research, some of the concerns which arose were accessibility to information as 
not many databases highlight the Equality Court judgments, as well as the extent of the 
information available as most cases are unreported or settled out-of-court.49 Being a gap 
study, a concern which arose for the writer is that the information available is retrospective in 
nature and illustrate trends rather than the present situation. 
 
1.9 Conclusion  
 
The Equality Act serves as a first step in transforming social realities. The Act plays a vital 
role in affirming South Africa’s commitment to equality in a practical fashion. Although 
significant progress has been made, with some refinement the Act and equality courts, will 
better achieve its objectives. This thesis supports and enriches the available knowledge about 
the Equality Act and Equality Courts’ remedies. The thesis also provides greater awareness of 
the social issues which the Equality Act seeks to address.   
                                                            
49 The South African Human Rights Commission’s 2017 Annual Report, for example reveals that whilst 43 
cases were reported in 2017, in only 18 were written judgements handed down (see South African Human 
Rights Commission Annual Report 2017 (2017). Available at 
https://www.sahrc.org.za/home/21/files/Annual%20Report%202018.pdf, accessed 08 February 2019. 
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CHAPTER TWO: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
‘Those who do not remember the past are condemned to repeat it’ – George Santayana 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
South Africa has a long and sad history of racial discrimination. Although this history can be 
traced back to the initial occupation of the Cape by the Dutch colonists in 1652,50 the rigid 
and systematic implementation of racial segregation on a nation-wide scale only began 
following the introduction of apartheid by the National Party government in 1948.51 The 
purpose of this chapter is to set out and discuss some of the key features of the apartheid 
system. This is because the prominent role the right to equality plays in the Constitution can 
be understood partly as a response to the horrors of apartheid. In addition, the purpose of this 
chapter is also to briefly set out and discuss the transition from apartheid to democracy. 
 




As pointed out above, the system of apartheid was introduced by the National Party after it 
won the general election in 1948.52 The system of apartheid was derived from the theoretical 
ideas developed primarily by Hendrik Verwoerd, who became the Prime Minister in 1958. 
Verwoerd’s ideas were subsequently adopted by the infamous Sauer Commission and then by 
the National Party itself. It is, consequently, not surprising that Verwoerd is known as the 
‘architect of apartheid’.53 
                                                            
50 NL Clark and WH Worger South Africa: The Rise and Fall of Apartheid 2ed (2011) 1. The Dutch colonists 
were able to colonise the Cape as a result of their superior weaponry and advanced infrastructure and 
instruments. Unfortunately, the Dutch colonists brought preconceived opinions about the indigenous people 
with them and regarded the indigenous people as ‘savage and inferior’ (R Kruger Racism and law: 
Implementing the right to equality in selected South African equality courts (Unpublished Thesis, Rhodes 
University, 2008) 18). 
51 The term ‘apartheid’ literally means ‘apartness’ in Afrikaans. See South African History Online ‘A history of 
Apartheid in South Africa’. Available at https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/history-apartheid-south-africa, 
accessed on 23 October 2019. 
52 E Oliver and W.H Oliver ‘The Colonisation of South Africa: A unique case’ (2017) 73(3) HTS Teologiese 
Studies/ Theological Studies #. Available at https://doi.org/10.4102/hts.v73i3.4498, accessed on 18 February 
2019.   




Verwoerd believed in the innate superiority of Western culture and that white people (both 
Afrikaans and English speaking) as a single unit had to lead development in South Africa.54 
Such a practice, although inherently racists, did not fit the formal sense of the word.55 The 
undertone of racism was astutely disguised in National Party dialogues which emphasised the 
importance of ‘the purity of God-created ethnicity’.56 Verwoerd, being a trained psychologist, 
was able to internalise his ideas into the minds of those who followed him.57  
 
Under his leadership, ‘apartheid’ was run as a policy of ‘separate development’.58 His 
philosophy operated on the pretence that a person ought to be engaged in the upliftment of 
his/her own ethnic group. Thereafter, the more developed (whites) would influence the less 
developed (people of colour) through political and economic interaction.59 Apartheid was 
based in four essential ideas: 
• First, all South Africans were classified as white, black, coloured or Asian (Indian). 
• Second, those South Africans who were classified as white were regarded as civilised 
and superior and thus were entitled to have absolute control over the state. 
• Third, white interests prevailed over other races’ interests and the state was not 
obligated to provide equal facilities for subordinate races. 
• Fourth, the white racial group, comprised of both the Afrikaans- and English-speaking 
whites, was viewed as a single unit. This differed from the stance taken on the 
Africans who were sub-divided into ten distinct nations.60  
 
In order to achieve these ideals, the National Party government passed tens of thousands of 
laws.61 For the sake of convenience, these laws have been divided loosely into two broad 
categories, namely those that established and promoted so-called ‘grand apartheid’ and those 
that established and promoted ‘petty apartheid’. Grand apartheid was aimed at segregating 
South Africans on a political and territorial basis by dividing the surface area of the country 
into geographically separate racial zones each with its own political authority. The idea was 
                                                            
54 Ibid.  
55 R Ross A concise history of South Africa 2ed (2008) 124. 
56 Ibid. 
57 R Ross A concise history of South Africa 2ed (2008) 125. 
58 JJ Venter ‘H.F. Verwoerd: Foundational aspects of his thought’ (1999) 64(4) Koers 417. 
59 Ibid. 
60 L Thompson A History of South Africa: Revised Edition (2000) 190. 
61 NL Clark and WH Worger South Africa: The Rise and Fall of Apartheid 2ed (2011) 48. 
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that these separate racial zones would eventually become independent states.62 Petty 
apartheid was aimed at segregating South Africans in their day-to-day lives by creating 
separate racially based personal, recreational and social facilities and institutions.63 
 
2.2.2 Grand apartheid 
 
Although the creation of separate and racially based geographical zones may be traced back 
to the pre-apartheid Black Land Acts of 191364 and 1936,65 the political and territorial 
segregation of black and white South Africans intensified following the introduction of 
apartheid. Among the most notorious measures that were passed to promote grand apartheid 
were the following: 
• the Population Registration Act;66  
• the Black Authorities Act;67  
• the Promotion of Black Self-Government Act;68 and 
• the Group Areas Act.69 
 
The Population Registration Act required every South African to be classified and registered 
from birth in accordance with the racial classifications created by the Act. Initially, the Act 
created three different racial classifications, namely black, white and coloured. Later, Asian 
(Indian) was added as a fourth classification. The Act was regarded as one of the pillars of 
apartheid. This is because the classifications created by it underpinned almost every 
subsequent apartheid statute. 
 
The Black Authorities Act provide for separate political structures for black South Africans 
by establishing traditional authorities for each ethnic group in the areas set aside by the Land 
Acts. It thus laid the basis for the policy of separate development. This Act was later 
supplemented by the Promotion of Black Self-Government Act which established a process 
                                                            
62 R Ross A concise history of South Africa 2ed (2008) 126. 
63 Ibid.  
64 Black Land Act 27 of 1913. 
65 Development Trust and Land Act 18 of 1936 
66 30 of 1950 
67 68 of 1951. 
68 46 of 1959. 
69 41 of 1950. This Act was repealed and replaced by the Group Area Act 77 of 1957 which in turn was repealed 
and replaced by the Group Areas Act 36 of 1966. 
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in terms of which each ethnic area could be transformed in an independent nation. Black 
South Africans would then exercise their civil and political rights in these nations and not in 
the rest of South Africa, where whites would reign supreme. 
 
The Group Areas Act was aimed at establishing segregated residential areas in urban areas 
for each race group and at controlling the acquisition, occupation and use of these areas. The 
designation of land as a group area set aside for a particular race group implied that a person 
falling outside that race group was prohibited from owning, occupying or using land in that 
area for any purpose (at least without a permit). It was practically impossible (because of 
registration requirements) to acquire ownership of land in contravention of this Act.  
 
2.2.3 Petty apartheid 
 
Once the mechanisms of racial classification were in place, an extensive body of legislation70 
was implemented to promote petty apartheid. These measures included:  
• the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act,71 which prohibited inter-racial marriages 
between whites and all other race groups; 
• the Immorality Act,72 which prohibited inter-racial sex between whites and all other 
race groups;  
• the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act,73 which directed that all races would have 
separate amenities (parks, public toilets, benches, etc.); and  
• the Bantu Education Act74 and Extension of University Education Act,75 which 
worked together to exclude blacks from the national education scheme and provided a 
separate body to control the provision of educational services. This resulted in fewer 
resources, inequalities in state subsidies and the eventual closure of many black 
schools.76  
                                                            
70 See generally M Horrell ‘Legislation and race relations: a summary of the main South African laws which 
affect race relations’ (1971). Available at https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/legislation-and-race-relations-a-
summary-of-the-main-south-african-laws-which-affect-race-relations, accessed on 18 February 2019. 
71 Act 55 of 1949. 
72 Act 21 of 1950. 
73 Act 49 of 1953. 
74 Act 47 of 1953. This Act is described as being one of the most despised measures of the apartheid government 
as it set a clear limit on black aspirations. It also affirmed the government’s commitment to stifling the black 
community as it presented black education as a privilege whilst white education was compulsory (see S Dubow 
Apartheid 1948-1994 (2014) 118). 
75 Act 45 of 1959. 




2.2.4 Other forms of discrimination 
 
During apartheid, gender discrimination in South Africa was also rife due to deeply rooted 
ethnic traditions and cultures which perceive women as inferior to men. As Meer has stated, 
while gender oppression might not have been an integral part of apartheid, the system 
confirmed these values and integrated them into its legal system.77 Evidence of gender 
inequalities are present from the debates of the 1980s which arose from the struggle for 
female equality and criticised them as possibly interrupting the struggle to end apartheid.78 
Many of the misogynistic beliefs of the time stemmed from what the colonisers and 
eventually the National Party government mistakenly believed Christianity stood for.79 
 
Another ground of oppression was homosexuality. The LGBTQIAP+ community has been 
described as being ‘forgotten during the apartheid era’.80 During the apartheid era gay men, 
lesbian women and other sexual minorities were categorised as criminals and rejected by 
society as outcasts and perverts.81 The condemnation of homosexuality existed as a 
consequence of radical religious beliefs.82 As Weeks points out, the provisions of the 
Immorality Act contained broad restrictions which included sexual acts associated with 
homosexuality.83 Given that apartheid outlawed anything that did not fall under the narrow 
criteria of ‘Boer culture’, there is no doubt that Weeks is correct.84 
                                                            
77 F Meer ‘The Future for Women’ (1992). Available at 
https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000090693/PDF/090699engo.pdf.multi.nameddest=90693, accessed 
on 18 February 2019.  
78 S Hutson ‘Gender Oppression and Discrimination in South Africa’ (2007). Available at 
https://dc.cod.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1026&context=
essai, accessed on 18 February 2019. 
79 D Pushparagavan ‘The History of LGBT legislation’ (2014). Available at 
https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/history-lgbt-legislation, accessed on 19 February 2019. 
80 Ibid.  
81 H de Ru ‘A Historical Perspective on the Recognition of Same-Sex Unions in South Africa’ (2013) 19(2) 
Fundamina 226. An example of the degree of prejudice is prevalent from the practice of gay white men being 
accused of being child molesters and subsequently arrested. 
82 See M Gevisser and E Cameron Defiant Desire: Gay and Lesbian Lives in South Africa (1995) for a detailed 
account of personal experiences of the LGBTQIAP community during apartheid.  
83 See generally J Weeks Sex, Politics and Society: The Regulation of Sexuality Since 1800 2ed (1981). The Act 
refered to ‘persons’ having sex with other ‘persons’. See also National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v 
Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) and National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of 
Home Affairs 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC).  
84 Boer Culture was based on Dutch ideals which mimic church teachings. Pushparagavan supports this 
interpretation in his article by quoting from Leviticus 18:22 ‘do not lie with a man as one lies with a woman; 
that is detestable’. See also NH Carrim Human rights and the construction of identities in South African 




2.2.5 Consequences of apartheid 
 
From the legislative sphere it is clear that apartheid encouraged not just separation based on a 
false sense of superiority of whites, but also inequality at the expense of blacks and other 
people of colour. Whites were given privileges whilst blacks and other race groups lived in 
constant fear and oppression. Apartheid augmented inequality, not only by institutionalising 
racism, but also by perpetuating prejudice in other areas including sexism and heterosexism.85  
 
The consequences of apartheid were far-reaching and still exist today. The complete 
disregard for black lives saw overcrowding in the homelands, the breakdown of families, 
senseless violence and the death of many people. The legacy of an economy built on un-
educated and under-paid workers has resulted in grinding poverty which means South Africa 
lacks both skilled labourers and a large consumer class.86 Apartheid left South African 
society divided and in need of measures to address the legacy of the past injustice.87 
 




From the late 1970s the apartheid system began to break down. The National Party 
government could no longer keep up with economic demands and changing social 
circumstances whilst still retaining a monopoly of political power.88 A combination of 
internal and external pressures placed immense pressure on the system.  
 
By this point in time the economy had come to be dominated by the manufacturing sector and 
the National Party government was forced to acknowledge the growing incompatibility 
between its segregation policies and capitalism.89 Complex manufacturing technologies 
required a skilled and semi-skilled workforce while apartheid essentially prevented the 
                                                            
85 NH Carrim Human rights and the construction of identities in South African education (Unpublished Thesis, 
University of Witwatersrand, 2007) 101.  
86 NL Clark and WH Worger South Africa: the rise and fall of apartheid (2004) 117. 
87 R Kruger Racism and law: Implementing the right to equality in selected South African equality courts 
(Unpublished Thesis, Rhodes University, 2008) 55. 
88 N Worden The making of modern South Africa 4ed (2007) 134. 
89 Ibid.  
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majority of the country’s people from acquiring the necessary skills. Although these skills 
could be found among whites, white men were conscripted into the South African Defence 
Force for ever increasing periods of time. This left the country with unskilled labourers who 
were unable to serve the needs of capitalism.  
 
Further pressure on the system emerged from the introduction of the Bantu Homelands 
Citizenship Act90 which provided that all Africans were to be given citizenship in self-
governing Bantustans.91 To implement these laws, the police force was frequently required to 
evict and forcibly remove people from their homes in ‘white’ South Africa and relocate them 
to designated sites in their particular Bantustan. Whilst the government viewed this as a 
necessary measure, the white population was less enthusiastic. A reported 50 percent of 
whites expressed explicit opposition to this change, whilst 40 percent were critical of the fact 
that too many resources were tied into establishing and developing the Bantustans.92 By 
1982, the National Party had started to lose the support of an increasing number of whites.93 
 
Whilst the morale of the white population was low, black resistance was growing in numbers 
and strength. The 1960s and 1970s saw the imprisonment of many of the prominent black 
activists. This show of force radicalised further opposition from black people, especially the 
semi-skilled youth who began to promote the Black Consciousness Movement.94 The 
Movement started from members of liberation organisations95 and sought to promote racial 
awareness and solidarity amongst black people who would then fight for freedom.96 In 1983 
black frustrations boiled over into unremitting opposition against the National Party’s plans 
for a ‘constitutional reform’.97 Clark suggests that this backlash became the beginning of the 
‘final downfall of apartheid’.98  
                                                            
90 Act 26 of 1970. 
91 LM Eades The End of Apartheid in South Africa (1999) 77. 
92 Ibid.  
93 Andries Treurnicht was a former member of the National Party who formed the Conservative Party to oppose 
the government’s so-called ‘power-sharing’. Many white people aligned themselves with his objectives and thus 
support for the National Party was lost making the government more susceptible to the political pressure of the 
time. See N Worden The making of modern South Africa 4ed (2007) 135. 
94 NL Clark and WH Worger South Africa: The Rise and Fall of Apartheid 2ed (2011) 68. 
95 Such as the African National Congress, the Pan Africanist Congress, the United Democratic Front, and the 
National Forum Committee. In 1959 Robert Sobukwe broke away from the ANC to form the PAC. Many of 
Sobukwe's ideas influenced the Black Consciousness Movement which developed in South Africa in the 1970s. 
96 See generally RH Davis Apartheid Unravels (1991) for a more detailed recollection of the features of the 
Black Consciousness Movement.  
97 NL Clark and WH Worger South Africa: The Rise and Fall of Apartheid 2ed (2011) 68. 




The increased domestic pressure gained international attention and lead to economic 
sanctions against South Africa. This had a significant effect as South Africa’s economy was 
reliant to a large degree on foreign capital. The country was also exceptionally vulnerable as 
it required imports of heavy machinery and natural oil. A spiral of decline emerged from the 
political unrest which was now fueled further by international condemnation. The United 
Nations (UN) consistently criticized South Africa’s political system and demanded political 
reform. The General Assembly passed a resolution which required member states to break 
diplomatic relations, close ports to South African ships and boycott South African trade.99 
This shadow of disapproval grew larger and darker when the Security Council imposed an 
arms embargo on the country after declaring the activities and policies of the National Party 
government to be a danger to international peace and security.  
 
In addition to pressure from the UN, further measures were taken by the international 
community. These included the following:  
• Approximately two hundred US companies disinvested from South Africa between 
1984 and 1989.  
• Several European countries suspended direct investments with South Africa in 1985 
and 1986.  
• Certain European countries took further measures, such as banning exports, tightening 
visa requirements, and ending sporting ties. 
• International banks imposed financial sanctions by refusing to grant new loans and by 
binding South Africa to stricter repayment terms on existing loans.100  
 
In addition to economic sanctions, foreign countries began to report more frequently and 
televise the violence within the country as a psychological measure to curb interest in South 
Africa and, in so doing, they also provided a platform for the voice of the Black 




                                                            
99 LM Eades The End of Apartheid in South Africa (1999) 84. 
100 Ibid.  
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2.3.2 The end of apartheid 
 
Both internal and international pressure took a toll on the National Party government. By the 
late 1980s many of the apartheid laws were repealed. In 1989, the National Party elected FW 
de Klerk as their new leader. One major step taken by him was lifting the ban on the 
liberation organisations. This was shortly followed by the release of Nelson Mandela from 
prison which marked the beginning of negotiations between the National Party and the 
liberation organisations which spanned two years. The outcome of these negotiations was a 
national vote for political power.   
 
The end of apartheid did not come easily. The National Party dedicated extensive resources 
to disrupt support for the liberation organisations. In March 1990 police opened fire on a 
crowd of 50 000 ANC supporters.101 From this point onwards, white supremacist groups 
began orchestrating shootings and bombings at mosques, synagogues, members of the ANC, 
and anti-apartheid newspapers. This was stimulated by de Klerk’s parliamentary opposition 
to Mandela’s ideas in which he suggested that Mandela’s ideas would suppress minorities.102  
 
Violence continued right up to the first democratic elections in April 1994. South Africa 
nevertheless elected its first democratic government under the presidency of Nelson Mandela. 
From these elections, came the interim Constitution103 as the fundamental law of South 
Africa until it was superseded by the Constitution104 on 4 February 1997. 
 
2.4 The interim Constitution  
 
The post-apartheid era was ushered in with the introduction of the interim Constitution which 
marked the end of the apartheid era, at least from a constitutional and legal 
perspective.105  This was not seen as a final Constitution but rather as an interim measure 
                                                            
101 This became known as the Sebokeng massacre in which 11 lives were lost and 400 people were injured. NL 
Clark and WH Worger South Africa: The Rise and Fall of Apartheid 2ed (2011) 113. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993. 
104 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
105 See generally FT Endoh ‘Democratic constitutionalism in post-apartheid South Africa: the interim 
Constitution revisited’ (2015) 7(1) Africa Review, 67-79. Available at 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09744053.2014.990769, accessed on 26 February 2019. 
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while the Constitutional Assembly negotiated and drafted a final Constitution.106 It is trite 
that a Constitution should be a people’s document.107 This means that the document should 
give effect to the will of people and act as both a decisive influence for good and a general 
moral compass in society. The interim Constitution was a long and detailed document of 222 
printed pages with wide-ranging provisions which borrowed from the United States as well as 
parts of Europe.108 The document was rigid. Any proposed amendments required a majority 
vote of two-thirds of attendees at a joint sitting of both houses of Parliament.109 This was 
aimed at protecting the supremacy of the Constitution which would be undermined if left 
vulnerable to the ordinary legislative process. 
 
South Africa utilised the interim Constitution as the first-leg of a two-stage process in the 
pursuit of democracy. In the preamble, the goal was set to create an order in which ‘all South 
Africans will be entitled to a common South African citizenship in a sovereign and 
democratic constitutional state in which there is equality between men and women and 
people of all races so that all citizens shall be able to enjoy and exercise their fundamental 
rights and freedoms’. As Mureinik famously observed, the commencement of the new 
constitutional era in South Africa, with a supreme Constitution and an entrenched Bill of 
Rights, represented a bridge from a culture of authority towards a culture of justification.110  
 
The Bill of Rights was a unique and far-reaching cog which afforded every person 
fundamental rights, including the right to be treated equally. This was in sharp contrast to the 
institutionalised discrimination of South Africa’s past. The ideas of the interim Constitution 
are central to a democracy as they strengthen the position of the so-called minority groups 
whilst maintaining the ideal of a constitutional state.111 The right to equality was guaranteed 
in section 8 of the interim Constitution.112 Section 8 is similar to the provisions of section 9 of 
                                                            
106 South African History online Drafting of the Final Constitution (2017). Available at 
https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/drafting-final-constitution#endnote-12, accessed on 05 March 2019. 
107 D Basson South Africa’s interim Constitution: Text and Notes (1994) 19.  
108 L Thompson A History of South Africa: Revised Edition (2000) 257. 
109 Ibid.  
110 E Mureinik ‘A Bridge to Where? Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights’ (1993) 10 SAJHR 32. 
111 Ibid.  
112 This section provided as follows: 
‘(1) Every person shall have the right to equality before the law and to equal protection of the law. 
(2)  No person shall be unfairly discriminated against, directly or indirectly, and, without derogating from the 
generality of this provision, on one or more of the following grounds in particular: race, gender, sex, ethnic or 
social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture or language. 
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the Constitution in outline, scope and structure. However, the provisions in the Constitution 
do appear more refined.113  
 
2.5 The Constitution 
 
2.5.1 Drafting of the Constitution 
 
The drafting of the Constitution can be divided into three distinct time periods:114  
(a)  the May 1994 negotiations leading up to the May 1996 deadline for finalising the 
Constitution;115 
(b)  the first Constitutional Court certification process (started in May 1996 and ending on 
6 September 1996 when the Court delivered judgment refusing to certify the new 
text); and 
(c)  the second round of negotiations in late September 1996 and early October 1996, 
leading to certification of the amended text by the Constitutional Court on 4 
December 1996.116 
 
Chapter 5 of the interim Constitution directed the drafting of the Constitution. On 8 May 
1996 the Constitutional Assembly completed a draft of the Constitution which consisted of 
most of the interim Constitution provisions, but there were differences which made them 
controversial to each other.117 The structure of government was immediately impacted even 
                                                            
(3)(a) This section shall not preclude measures designed to achieve the adequate protection and advancement of 
persons or groups or categories of persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination, in order to enable their full 
and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedom.  
(b) Every person or community dispossessed of rights in land before the commencement of this Constitution 
under any law which would have been inconsistent with subsection (2) had that subsection been in operation at 
the time of the dispossession, shall be entitled to claim restitution of such rights subject to and in accordance 
with sections 121, 122 and 123. 
(4) Prima facie proof of discrimination on any of the grounds specified in subsection (2) shall be presumed to be 
sufficient proof of unfair discrimination as contemplated in that subsection, until the contrary is established’. 
113 See below.  
114 J Sarkin ‘The Drafting of South Africa's Final Constitution from a Human-Rights Perspective’ (1999) 47(1) 
The American Journal of Comparative Law  67 69. 
115 This phase closed on 8th May 1996 (the day of the adoption ceremony).  
116 See generally J Sarkin ‘The Drafting of South Africa's Final Constitution from a Human-Rights Perspective’ 
(1999) 47(1) The American Journal of Comparative Law 67-87 for greater detail.  
117 One of the differences was that the Government of National Unity would be replaced by a majoritarian 
government in the national elections. The Final constitution was to extinguish power sharing and the party who 
received majority vote would then appoint cabinet members and other officials without having to consult with 
the National Assembly minority parties. 
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before the Constitution was approved or implemented.118 It was agreed that the draft 
Constitution would thus have to be scrutinised by the Constitutional Court which referred it 
back to the Constitutional Assembly for revision on certain aspects as it failed to incorporate 
all 34 Constitutional Principles of the interim Constitution.119  
 
The revised Constitution came into force on 4 February 1997. Given South Africa's history of 
oppression and human rights violations, it was essential that the final Constitution offered 
maximum protection to human rights. The Bill of Rights in the Constitution thus, guided by 
international intervention, includes and protects more rights than the Bill of Rights in the 
interim Constitution.  
 
2.5.2 International considerations  
 
Prior to the interim Constitution the protection of human rights in South Africa had not 
received the consideration it enjoyed generally in the international community. One possible 
reason for this was that South Africa followed the principle of parliamentary sovereignty 
which allowed Parliament to pass legislation that violated human rights and was contrary to 
international human rights standards.120 With the transition to democracy, international law 
came to the forefront in the interpretation of human rights for two reasons: 
• first, the Bill of Rights contains provisions similar to international law which holds 
extensive literature on the interpretation of these rights, and  
• second, courts are obligated121 by section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution122 to consider 
international law when interpreting the Bill of Rights. Moreover, South Africa is 
                                                            
118 The indicators of this was when the NP announced that they would resign from the Government of National 
Unity but still tried to assure their supporters that they would maintain an active role in the National Assembly 
and in politics. See South African History online Drafting of the Final Constitution (2017). Available at 
https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/drafting-final-constitution#endnote-12, accessed on 05 March 2019. 
119 Ibid.  
120 BV Slade International Law in the Interpretation of Sections 25 and 26 of the Constitution (Unpublished 
Thesis, Stellenbosch University, 2010) 14. 
121 Section 35(1) of Chapter 3 of the Interim Constitution provides that in interpreting the provisions of this 
Chapter a court of law shall promote the values which underlie an open and democratic society based on 
freedom and equality and shall, where applicable, have regard to public international law applicable to the 
protection of the rights entrenched in this Chapter, and may have regard to comparable foreign case law. This 
was later replaced by section 39(1)(b) of the Final Constitution.  
122 Section 39(1)(b) of the Final Constitution refers to courts, tribunals and forums as obligated to consider 
international when interpreting any provision in the bill of rights. The reason for this approach is that, in drafting 
the bill of rights, lawyers and politicians had to consult international and foreign law in order to draft the bill of 
rights. See generally AJ Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1997).  
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bound by international agreements signed and ratified as these impose obligations on 
the country which have to be fulfilled. 
 
The Bill of Rights in both the interim Constitution and the Constitution was drafted to align 
with specific international human rights instruments. Strong reliance was placed on the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),123 the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),124 the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), 125 the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR).126 Whilst a detailed analysis of 
these instruments falls beyond the scope of this thesis, it is necessary to note that the first 
three instruments strive to protect individual human rights and are referred to as the 
international bill of rights. The incorporation of these instruments in the Constitution is 
evident from a number of provisions which not only seek to echo the international approach 
in protecting individual human rights, but also specifically aim to correct the injustices and 
oppression of the past by providing constitutional mechanisms with which to promote 
equality and in so doing prevent unfair discrimination.  
 
2.5.3 Constitutional provisions relating to equality and non-discrimination  
 
The preamble of the Constitution recognises the injustices of the past and guarantees the 
protection and promotion of human rights to the benefit of all South Africans. In order to 
uphold this together with the international principles and obligations, various provisions have 
been enacted.127 The most important of these is the right to equality guaranteed in section 9 of 
the Constitution. 
 
                                                            
123 Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, Resolution 217(III) of 10 December 1948, UN doc 
A/810. 
124 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) 
of 16 December 1966, entered into force on 3 January 1976, 993 UNTS 3. 
125 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) 
of 16 December 1966, entered into force on 23 March 1976, UNTS 171. 
126 Kruger refers to the African Charter on Human and People’s rights as being ‘the most important human 
rights document on the continent’. R Kruger Racism and law: Implementing the right to equality in selected 
South African equality courts (Unpublished Thesis, Rhodes University, 2008) 79. See also D Prevost ‘South 
Africa as an Illustration of the Development in International Human Rights Law’ (1999) 24 South African 
Yearbook of International Law 211-23 for a more detailed discussion about the adoption of these conventions.  
127 See generally sections 7, 36 and 39 of the Constitution.  
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Section 9 has two key goals: The first is to promote equality and the equal protection of the 
law and the second is to prohibit unfair discrimination by both the state and private persons. 
The first goal is articulated in section 9(1) of the Constitution and the second in sections 9(3) 
and 9(4). Section 9(3) prohibits unfair discrimination by the state and thus applies vertically, 
while section 9(4) prohibits unfair discrimination by private persons and thus applies 
horizontally. Section 9(4) also provides that national legislation must be passed ‘to prevent or 
prohibit unfair discrimination’. 
 
The promotion of equality guaranteed in section 9(1) is supplemented by section 9(2) of the 
Constitution which requires the state to take positive steps to address the deep social and 
economic inequalities that exist in South Africa and which were brought about largely as a 
result of racial discrimination during the colonial and apartheid eras. As the Constitutional 
Court stated in Minister of Finance v Van Heerden,128 restitutionary measures are mandated 
by section 9(2) as part of a ‘credible and abiding process of reparation for past exclusion, 
dispossession, and indignity within the discipline of our constitutional framework’. 
Restitutionary measures, therefore, are ‘a vital component of our transformative 
constitutional order’.129  
 
In order to enhance the prohibition against unfair discrimination, section 9(5) of the 
Constitution provides that discrimination on any of the grounds expressly listed in section 
9(3) is automatically presumed to be unfair, ‘unless it is established that the discrimination is 
fair’. The practical effect of this provision is that it relieves the victim of the burden of 
proving that discrimination on a listed ground is also unfair. Instead, it placed the burden of 
doing so on the perpetrator.  
 
The significance of the right to equality is further highlighted in section 37 of the 
Constitution which protects the section 9 right as non-derogable even at times of emergency. 
Whilst the section allows for an Act of Parliament to limit the operation of fundamental rights 
during a state of emergency, it specifically provides that such an Act may not allow for unfair 
discrimination on the basis of race, colour, ethnic or social origin, sex, religion or language. 
                                                            
128 Minister of Finance v Van Heerden 20004 (6) SA 121 (CC) at para 25. 
129 See Minister of Constitutional Development v South African Restructuring and Insolvency Practitioners 




The equality right is also subject to the limitations clause contained in section 36 of the 
Constitution which states:  
 
(1)  The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the extent 
that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including:  
(a) the nature of the right;  
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation;  
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation;  
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and  
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.  
(2)  Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the Constitution, no law may limit any 
right entrenched in the Bill of Rights’. 
 
The formulation of section 36 provides a commendable effort to create a fair test by 
balancing relevant factors. However, it is important that, in implementation, courts are stricter 




The discussion delivered above indicates that discrimination has deep roots in South Africa. 
A racist hierarchy, which was reflected in law, was established from the earliest colonial 
settlement of South Africa. This discrimination spread throughout South Africa and included 
all areas of life such as sexuality and gender. Inequality and discrimination persevered 
throughout South Africa transcending decades and breeding an intolerant society. Law was 
instrumental in this process of institutionalising inequality and discrimination in South 
Africa. Through the medium of apartheid laws, barriers were created between the white 
people and those who strayed from the Western, Christian ideals brought by the colonisers. 
The restrictive laws, however, were inefficient in addressing an ever-changing society whilst 
still favouring white people. As the system began to breakdown, the promise of a new South 
Africa emerged.  
 
                                                            
130 T Loenen ‘The Equality Clause in the South African Constitution: Some Remarks from a Comparative 




A new and democratic South Africa emerged inheriting a legacy of a racism and division of 
its population, both in law and society. The new constitutional dispensation is tasked with the 
challenged to overcome the unequal cleft of South African society. It is trite that law was one 
of the most vital means by which inequality was entrenched in our society and thus now, in a 
post-apartheid society, it has the task of addressing and transforming the inequality.  
 
International law provisions aimed at the eradication of discrimination and inequality were 
established and lend quite nicely to South African law. It provides a standard in respect of 
equality and non-discrimination which serves as a benchmark for South African law. The 
constitutional commitment to the attainment of equality and the abolition of unfair 
discrimination on a variety of grounds mirrors the stance of international law. More 
significantly, there is congruence between international law standards and the new South 
African approach in relation to the protection of a person’s inherent equal dignity and worth 
by the equality right.  
 
A summary131 of the Constitutional provisions in respect of equality and non-discrimination 
can be presented as follows: 
• Equal protection by the law is emphasised as an objective of the Constitution. 
• Equality, together with other constitutional values, has to inform the application, 
interpretation and limitation of all rights. 
• The right to equality secures equal protection and benefit of the law and prohibits 
direct and indirect unfair discrimination by the state and individuals on listed and 
related grounds.  
• Section 9(2) furthermore includes measures designed to enhance the position of 
previously disadvantaged people in the pursuit of equality. 
• The Constitution specifically requires the enactment of legislation to prevent or 
prohibit unfair discrimination. This legislation has taken the form of the Equality Act 
which adds meaning to the equality clause as contained in section 9.  
                                                            
131 See R Kruger Racism and law: Implementing the right to equality in selected South African equality courts 
(Unpublished Thesis, Rhodes University, 2008) 103. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE EQUALITY ACT 
 




Given South Africa’s discriminatory past, it is not surprising that section 9(4) of the 
Constitution imposed an obligation on Parliament to enact national legislation to prevent or 
prohibit unfair discrimination. This obligation was fulfilled when Parliament passed the 
Equality Act. The purpose of this chapter is to set out and discuss the provisions of the 
Equality Act in the light of the Constitution and in relation to its own objectives. In addition, 
the purpose of this chapter is also to locate the Equality Act in the current context of South 
Africa.  
 
3.2 The history of the Equality Act 
 
The responsibility for fulfilling the obligation imposed on the state by section 9(4) of the 
Constitution was initially allocated to the Department of Justice, which adopted an innovative 
and inclusive procedure for drafting the Equality Act.132 Instead of carrying out the 
responsibility of doing so itself, the Department – together with the South African Human 
Rights Commission – established an Equality Drafting Unit (EDU).133 The EDU, which was 
launched in May 1998, was tasked with drafting a detailed framework document before 4 
February 2000.134  
 
In executing its mandate, the EDU sought to utilise a broad range of resources135 through the 
establishment of theme groups and the commissioning of papers on a variety of topics, which 
allowed input from various groups regarding the framework document.136 By July 1999, the 
                                                            
132 Albertyn et al. note that, despite the flaws in the Equality Act, it was drafted with due regard to the 
constitutional and public significance which it holds (see C Albertyn, B Goldblatt & C Roederer Introduction to 
the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (2002)). 
133 C Albertyn, B Goldblatt & C Roederer Introduction to the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (2002) 2. 
134 R Kruger Racism and law: Implementing the right to equality in selected South African equality courts 
(Unpublished Thesis, Rhodes University, 2008) 150. 
135 Such as researchers, experts, non-governmental organisations, and even individuals.  
136 C Albertyn, B Goldblatt & C Roederer Introduction to the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (2002) 2. 
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EDU produced and handed over the framework document to a drafting team, appointed by 
the Minister, who presented a draft bill to Cabinet later that year.137 
 
On 25 October 1999, the Cabinet approved bill was published in the Government Gazette and 
introduced in the National Assembly.138 After it was introduced in the National Assembly, 
the bill was referred to an ad hoc committee appointed by Parliament for detailed 
consideration. As a part of this process, the ad hoc committee was also required to facilitate 
public participation by inviting the public to submit written and oral comments to it. The ad 
hoc committee was given a deadline of January 2000.139 
 
During the process of public participation, the bill was subject to extensive criticism by a 
broad range of bodies from all sides of the political spectrum.140 As a result of these 
criticisms, the ad hoc committee, together with the Minister’s drafting team and independent 
experts, reshaped the bill.141 These changes and revisions, however, did not affect the core 
substance of the bill and the concept of substantive equality that it sought to promote 
remained largely unchanged.142  
 
The bill was passed by both houses of Parliament at the end of January 2000 and then 
submitted to the President for his assent and signature. The President assented to the bill on 2 
February 2000 and some of its provisions were brought into operation on 1 September 
2000.143 The remaining provisions and especially those relating to the prohibition of unfair 
discrimination were brought into operation almost three years later on 16 June 2003.144 
 
This exposition of the drafting history of the Equality Act illustrates that it was finalised 
under extreme time-constraints. It is for this reason that the Equality Act is imperfect in 
                                                            
137 R Kruger Racism and law: Implementing the right to equality in selected South African equality courts 
(Unpublished Thesis, Rhodes University, 2008) 150-151. 
138 The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Bill [B57-1999] was introduced in terms 
of GN 2399 of 1999 in GG 20572 of 25 October 1999. 
139 C Albertyn, B Goldblatt & C Roederer Introduction to the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (2002) 2. 
140 Ibid. 
141 SB Gutto Equality and Non-discrimination: The Political Economy of Law and Law Making (2001) 21. 
142 C Albertyn, B Goldblatt & C Roederer Introduction to the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (2002) 3. 
143 R Kruger Racism and law: Implementing the right to equality in selected South African equality courts 
(Unpublished Thesis, Rhodes University, 2008) 152. 
144 Ibid.  
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certain aspects.145 These drafting concerns will be discussed further in the thesis. The account 
of the drafting history exposes the hopes of the legislature for transformation through the use 
of the Equality Act. This intention is further present in the Equality Act’s objectives.  
 
3.3 The aims and objects of the Equality Act 
 
The aims and objects of the Equality Act are set out in the preamble and the objects clause. 
The preamble, which refers explicitly to the transformatory goals which the Equality Act 
seeks to achieve,146 states, inter alia, that: 
 
‘[t]he consolidation of democracy in our country requires the eradication of social and economic inequalities, 
especially those that are systemic in nature, which were generated in our history by colonialism, apartheid and 
patriarchy, and which brought pain and suffering to the great majority of our people; 
 
Although significant progress has been made in restructuring and transforming our society and its institutions, 
systemic inequalities and unfair discrimination remain deeply embedded in social structures, practices and 
attitudes, undermining the aspirations of our constitutional democracy; 
 
The basis for progressively redressing these conditions lies in the Constitution which, amongst others, upholds 
the values of human dignity, equality, freedom and social justice in a united, non-racial and non-sexist society 
where all may flourish; 
… 
 
This Act endeavours to facilitate the transition to a democratic society, united in its diversity, marked by human 
relations that are caring and compassionate, and guided by the principles of equality, fairness, equity, social 
progress, justice, human dignity and freedom.’ 
 
The transformatory goals referred to in the preamble are echoed in the objects clause. This 
clause states that the objects of the Equality Act are: 
 
‘(a)  to enact legislation required by section 9 of the Constitution:  
(b)  to give effect to the letter and spirit of the Constitution. In particular:  
(i)  the equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms by every person:  
(ii)  the promotion of equality;  
                                                            
145 C Albertyn, B Goldblatt & C Roederer Introduction to the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (2002) 3. 
146 R Kruger Racism and law: Implementing the right to equality in selected South African equality courts 
(Unpublished Thesis, Rhodes University, 2008) 152. 
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(iii)  the values of non-racialism and non-sexism contained in section 1 of the Constitution; 
(iv)  the prevention of unfair discrimination and protection of human dignity as contemplated in 
sections 9 and 10 of the Constitution;  
(v)  the prohibition of advocacy of hatred, based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion, that 
constitutes incitement to cause harm as contemplated in section 16(2)(c) of the Constitution 
and section 12 of this Act;  
(c)  to provide for measures to facilitate the eradication of unfair discrimination, hate speech and 
harassment, particularly on the grounds of race, gender and disability;  
(d)  to provide for procedures for the determination of circumstances under which discrimination is unfair:  
(e)  to provide for measures to educate the public and raise public awareness on the importance of 
promoting equality and overcoming unfair discrimination, hate speech and harassment;  
(f)  to provide remedies for victims of unfair discrimination, hate speech and harassment and persons 
whose right to equality has been infringed;  
(g)  to set out measures to advance persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination:  
(h)  to facilitate further compliance with international law obligations including treaty obligations in terms 
of, amongst others, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.’147 
 
In light of these provisions, Kok contends that the purpose of the Equality Act is to stand as 
an avenue for the wishes of Parliament in order to send a strong moral message that it views 
discrimination as a social evil.148 He then elaborates on this statement by arguing that the 
legislature may wish to reach into the hearts and minds of its subjects in order to affect 
fundamental changes in basic social relationships through the enactment of the Equality 
Act.149 
 
In support of his argument, Kok draws on the work of Gutto who defines ‘social legislation’ 
as ‘laws directed at normalising the abnormalities of the past and/or extending the boundaries 
of policies, law and practices in line with the national agenda of building a progressive and 
caring society where social inequalities are reduced to a minimum and democratic values 
permeate all social relations’.150 Albertyn et al., however, argue that the Equality Act merely 
                                                            
147 Section 2. 
148 A Kok ‘The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000: Court-driven or 
Legislature driven Societal Transformation?’ (2008) 19 Stell LR 124. 
149 Ibid.  
150 SB Gutto Equality and Non-discrimination: The Political Economy of Law and Law Making (2001) 8. Kok 
distinguishes between anti-discrimination, social and transformative legislation. He then draws uses each of 
these terms interchangeably to refer to the Equality Act as (he states) all these ‘types’ of transformation may be 
identified from various provisions in the Act. 
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seeks to provide a legal mechanism with which to address and remedy unfair 
discrimination.151   
 
3.4 The two pillars of the Equality Act 
 
As we have already seen the transformative goals of the Equality Act rest on two pillars, first, 
the prevention, prohibition and elimination of unfair discrimination, hate speech and 
harassment and, second, the promotion of equality. The provisions regulating the first pillar 
are set out in Chapter Two of the Equality Act and the provisions regulating the second pillar 
are set out in Chapter Five of the Equality Act. 
 
Chapter Two is divided into seven sections. The first four sections prohibit unfair 
discrimination both generally (section 6) and on the specified grounds of race, gender and 
disability (sections 7, 8 and 9 respectively). The remaining three sections prohibit hate 
speech, harassment and the dissemination and publication of unfair discriminatory 
information that unfairly discriminates (sections 10, 11 and 12 respectively). 
 
The prohibition of unfair discrimination will be discussed first, followed by the prohibition of 
hate speech and harassment. 
  




The general prohibition of unfair discrimination is regulated by section 6 of the Equality Act 
and simply provides that neither the state nor any private person may unfairly discriminate 
against any other person.  
 
This provision mirrors those set out in section 9(3) and section 9(4) of the Constitution. In 
both instances the prohibition applies to the state and individuals and only prohibits unfair 
discrimination. It is, therefore, important to distinguish between these two concepts. 
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Discrimination is defined in section 1 of the Equality Act as: 
 
‘any act or omission, including a policy, law, rule, practice, condition or situation which directly or indirectly:  
(a)  imposes burdens, obligations or disadvantage on; or  
(b)  withholds benefits, opportunities or advantages from, any person on one or more of the prohibited 
grounds’. 
 
The ‘prohibited grounds’ referred to in paragraph (b) are also defined in section 1. This 
section provides that the prohibited grounds are:  
 
‘(a)  race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, 
disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language, birth and HIV/AIDS status; or 
(b)  any other ground where discrimination based on that other ground: 
(i) causes or perpetuates systemic disadvantage; 
(ii) undermines human dignity; or 
(iii) adversely affects the equal enjoyment of a person’s rights and freedoms in a serious manner 
that is comparable to discrimination on a ground in paragraph (a)’. 
 
Although the grounds listed under the Equality Act are wider than those listed in the 
Constitution, given the purpose of the Equality Act, it is submitted that the extended list and 
open-ended provisions are necessary to afford wider protection to victims of unfair 
discrimination and respond to changes in society without the delays usually associated with 
amending legislation.  
 
As Albertyn et al point out, the concept of discrimination may be viewed in two different 
ways. The one view, they argue, places emphasis on ‘different treatment’.152 Under this 
approach, any different treatment on any of the prohibited grounds would be discrimination. 
Thus it is wrong to use ‘arbitrary characteristics’153 to treat people differently. The alternate 
view, however, places emphasis on the ‘harmful impact’.154 In terms of this approach the test 
                                                            
152 C Albertyn, B Goldblatt & C Roederer Introduction to the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (2002) 32. 
153 Ibid. Such characteristics would include race, gender or sexual orientation. Albertyn et al. highlight that such 
a view would also regard affirmative action as discrimination.   
154 Ibid.  
39 
 
would be whether the different treatment has resulted in harm or prejudice. Different 
treatment can be good in the same way that treating people equally should be discriminatory 
if it results in a harmful result. The laws of South Africa are egalitarian in nature155 and thus 
the second view is adopted by and necessary to the interpretation of the Equality Act. 
 
3.5.3 Unfair discrimination 
 
Unlike discrimination, the Equality Act does not define unfair discrimination. It does, 
however, regulate the manner in which fairness and unfairness may be determined.  
 
Section 14(1) of the Equality Act begins in this respect by providing that discrimination will 
not be unfair if it is ‘designed to protect or advance persons or categories of persons 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination or the members of such groups or categories of 
persons’. In other words, discrimination is not unfair if it amounts to affirmative action. 
 
Section 14(2) then goes on to state that when it comes to determining whether the respondent 
has proved that discrimination is fair, the following criteria must be taken into account: first, 
the context; second, the factors referred to in section 14(3); and third, ‘whether the 
discrimination reasonably and justifiably differentiates between persons according to 
objectively determinable criteria, intrinsic to the activity concerned’. 
 
Finally, section 14(3) lists the factors referred to in paragraph (b) above. These factors 
include: 
 
‘(a)  whether the discrimination impairs or is likely to impair human dignity;  
(b)  the impact or likely impact of the discrimination on the complainant;  
(c)  the position of the complainant in society and whether he or she suffers from patterns of disadvantage 
or belongs to a group that suffers from such patterns of disadvantage; 
(d)  the nature and extent of the discrimination;  
(e)  whether the discrimination is systemic in nature;  
(f)  whether the discrimination has a legitimate purpose;  
(g)  whether and to what extent the discrimination achieves its purpose;  
                                                            
155 President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC). In this judgment, the Constitutional 
Court held that ‘[t]he South African Constitution is primarily and emphatically an egalitarian Constitution… in 
the light of our own particular history, and our vision for the future, a Constitution was written with equality at 
its centre. Equality is our Constitution’s focus and its organising principle’ (at para 74).  
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(h)  whether there are less restrictive and less disadvantageous means to achieve the purpose;  
(i)  whether and to what extent the respondent has taken such steps as being reasonable in the 
circumstances to: 
(i)  address the disadvantage which arises from or is related to one or more of the prohibited 
grounds; or  
(ii)  accommodate diversity’.156 
 
These provisions are loosely based on the approach adopted by the Constitutional Court in 
Harksen v Lane NO,157 together with the reasonableness considerations of section 36 of the 
Constitution.158 It is important to note that not all of the criteria mentioned in section 14 of 
the Equality Act are applicable in every cases, nor do those that are relevant necessarily bear 
the same weight in the enquiry. Each case has to be decided on its own particular facts and 
circumstances.159 
 
The ‘context’ referred to in section 14(2)(a) of the Equality Act includes the existing South 
African social, economic and political circumstances when the specific case is heard.160 This 
is a fairly established approach in South Africa, and one that has been endorsed by the 
Constitutional Court on many occasions.161  
 
Kok criticises section 14(2)(c) as being a ‘clumsy attempt by the drafters of the Act … to 
distinguish between ‘discrimination’ and ‘mere economic differentiation’’.162 Further 
criticisms arise from the case of MEC for Education: Kwazulu-Natal v Pillay,163 where 
O’Regan J noted that ‘this poorly drafted section is … not particularly helpful to a court faced 
with the determination of what constitutes fairness’. It is submitted that this subsection is 
vague and subtracts from the protection offered by the Constitution in section 9.  
 
                                                            
156 Section 14(3). 
157 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) at para 51. 
158 R Kruger Racism and law: Implementing the right to equality in selected South African equality courts 
(Unpublished Thesis, Rhodes University, 2008) 158. 
159 Du Preez v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2006 (5) SA 592 (Eq) at para 25. 
160 AJ Kok A socio-legal analysis of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 
2000 (Unpublished Thesis, University of Pretoria, 2007) 148. 
161 See generally President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC) at para 41. 
162 AJ Kok A socio-legal analysis of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 
2000 (Unpublished Thesis, University of Pretoria, 2007) 148. 
163 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC). 
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Most of the criteria set out in section 14 are similar to those found in Harksen v Lane NO. 
The Harksen analysis established that to determine fairness, one must place the value of 
human dignity at the centre of the analysis and weigh it in relation to a determination of the 
impact of the discrimination on the complainant.164 A similar approach is adopted by the 
courts in applying the criteria listed in section 14 of the Equality Act.165 It is submitted that 
despite the explicit list of criteria to be considered, the test remains relatively 
indeterminate.166 Nevertheless, the courts are tasked with applying this section as it stands in 
a way that is ‘constitutionally defensible’167. 
 
Finally, it is important to note that the question of onus is dealt with in section 13 of the 
Equality Act. According to this section, where a complainant makes out a prima facie case of 
discrimination, the respondent must either prove that the discrimination did not take place or 
that the conduct does not relate to one or more of the prohibited grounds.168 Section 13(2) 
further provides: 
   
If the discrimination did take place: 
(a)  on a ground in paragraph (a) of the definition of “prohibited grounds” ... then it is unfair, unless the 
respondent proves that the discrimination is fair;  
(b)  on a ground in paragraph (b) of the definition of “prohibited grounds”, then it is unfair:  
(i)  if one or more of the conditions set out in paragraph (b) of the definition of “prohibited 
grounds” is established; and  
(ii)  unless the respondent proves that the discrimination is fair.’169 
 
3.6 The prohibition of unfair discrimination on the ground of race 
 
The prohibition of unfair discrimination on the ground of race is regulated by section 7 of the 
Equality Act. Section 7 provides in this respect that: 
                                                            
164 Harksen v Lane NO 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC) at paras 53-54. 
165 It is unnecessary to delve further into this analysis for the purposes of this thesis as the factors have been 
fairly well explained by previous authors over the past two decades of the existence of the Act. For this 
discussion see generally AJ Kok A socio-legal analysis of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (Unpublished Thesis, University of Pretoria, 2007). 
166 See generally AJ Kok A socio-legal analysis of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (Unpublished Thesis, University of Pretoria, 2007) and Loenen, T ‘The Equality 
Right in the South African Constitution: Some Remarks from a Comparative Perspective’ (1997) 13 SAJHR. 
167 MEC for Education: Kwazulu-Natal and Others v Pillay 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC) at para 70. 
168 Section 13(1) of the Equality Act. 
169 For a summary of this procedure see C Albertyn, B Goldblatt & C Roederer Introduction to the Promotion of 




‘Subject to section 6, no person may unfairly discriminate against any person on the ground of race, including:  
(a)  the dissemination of any propaganda or idea, which propounds the racial superiority or inferiority of 
any person, including incitement to, or participation in, any form of racial violence;  
(b)  the engagement in any activity which is intended to promote, or has the effect of promoting, 
exclusivity, based on race;  
(c)  the exclusion of persons of a particular race group under any rule or practice that appears to be 
legitimate but which is actually aimed at maintaining exclusive control by a particular race group;  
(d)  the provision or continued provision of inferior services to any racial group, compared to those of 
another racial group;  
(e)  the denial of access to opportunities, including access to services or contractual opportunities for 
rendering services for consideration, or failing to take steps to reasonably accommodate the needs of 
such persons.’ 
 
Given that South Africa has a long history of racial discrimination, it is not surprising that the 
Equality Act does not simply prohibit unfair discrimination on the basis of race, but goes 
much further and prohibits several of the diverse ways in which racial discrimination 
manifests itself in society. By placing greater emphasis on racial discrimination and outlining 
various actions that are prohibited, the Equality Act provides additional protection insofar as 
racial discrimination is concerned.  
 
While the decision to prohibit some of the ways in which racial discrimination manifests 
itself is welcome, a number of criticisms may be levelled against section 7 of the Equality 
Act. One of these is that section 7(a) appears to be misplaced and should rather have been 
included under section 10 which prohibits hate speech.170 In addition, it appears to prohibit 
racially based hate speech more expansively than section 16(2) of the Constitution does.171  
 
Academic authors are in disagreement as to the most appropriate way to interpret and 
implement section 7(a). Albertyn et al believe that section 7(a) is a duplication of section 10 
and could be regarded as an alternative vehicle for regulating racist hate speech.172 It is 
                                                            
170 A Kok ‘The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act: why the controversy?’ 
(2001) 9 TSAR 297. See also GS Vogt ‘Non-discrimination on the Grounds of Race in South Africa – With 
Special Reference to the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act’ (2001) 45 JAL 
196-209. 
171 J Botha & A Govindjee ‘The regulation of racially derogatory speech in the Promotion of Equality and 
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000’ (2016) 32(2) SAJHR 303. 
172 C Albertyn, B Goldblaat & C Roederer (eds) Introduction to the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of 
Unfair Discrimination Act, Act 4 of 2000 (2001) 58. See also a similar discussion in A Kok ‘The Promotion of 
Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act: why the controversy?’ (2001) 9 TSAR 297, and R Kruger 
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submitted, however, that this position is problematic as it would amount to an inconsistency 
in application because section 15 of the Equality Act exempts hate speech from a 
determination of fairness.  
 
It is further submitted that the provision has a valuable role to play and thus should be 
interpreted to mean that the dissemination of ideas of racial superiority or hatred is prohibited 
if its intended effect is to incite racial discrimination or violence against a target group of 
persons.173 This approach enables a proper implementation of the provisions whilst ensuring 
that the Equality Act is interpreted in accordance with the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.174 
 
The remaining provisions of sections 7 are fairly straight forward as they all relate to the 
imposition of disadvantage or the withholding of an advantage based on race which operates 
in line with the Constitutional Court's definition of ‘discrimination’.175 It is submitted that 
section 7 plays an educative role in order to assist the Equality Courts.  
 
Despite the extensive prohibitions of the Constitution and the Equality Act, racism is still rife 
in South Africa. In 2018, the South African Human Right Commission received 486 ‘race-
related’ complaints which amounted to almost 10% of complaints about rights violations.176 
In 2017, a report by the Solidarity Research Institute analysed and commented on various 
cases of hate speech and racism that attracted media attention.177 In its finding, the Institute 
noticed a rising trend of ‘systemic racial discrimination against white people’ which is 
‘creating a climate where it is becoming dangerously common to apply racial discrimination 
against minorities’.178 Apart from the instances of racism covered in the cases themselves, a 
                                                            
Racism and law: Implementing the right to equality in selected South African equality courts (Unpublished 
Thesis, Rhodes University, 2008) 159-163. 
173 See J Botha & A Govindjee ‘The regulation of racially derogatory speech in the Promotion of Equality and 
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000’ (2016) 32(2) SAJHR 303 for support of this position. 
174 Ibid. 
175 A Kok ‘The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act: why the controversy?’ 
(2001) 9 TSAR 298. 
176 J Kane-Berman ‘The SAHRC and race’. Available at https://www.politicsweb.co.za/opinion/the-sahrc-and-
race, accessed on 10 May 2019.  
177 Many of these cases are discussed in great detail in Chapter 5. It is, therefore, unnecessary to duplicate such 
discussion. To access the cases and discussion see E Brink and C Mulder ‘How the response to black and white 
racism differs’ (4 April 2017). Available at https://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/how-the-response-to-
black-and-white-racism-differs, accessed on 10 May 2019. 
178 E Brink and C Mulder ‘How the response to black and white racism differs’ (4 April 2017). Available at 
https://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/how-the-response-to-black-and-white-racism-differs, accessed on 10 
May 2019.  
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further hidden discrimination revealed itself from the study. In its conclusion, the Institute 
remarked that ‘the fact that open incitement to slaughtering white people did not remotely 
receive the same coverage as a racially driven description of black people, speaks volumes’. 
It is submitted that the trend observed by the Institute is as a consequence of a misdirected 
and emphatic focus solely on racism against the backdrop of the history of the country. It is 
further submitted that a more holistic and egalitarian view would be to not only consider the 
history of the country but also the objectives of the equality legislation. The trend identified 
inevitably results in more polarisation and racial separation and thus it is necessary that all 
instances of racism be dealt with equal and consistent fervor.179  
 
3.7 The prohibition of unfair discrimination on the ground of gender 
 
The prohibition of unfair discrimination on the ground of gender is regulated by section 8 of 
the Equality Act. Section 8 provides in this respect that: 
 
‘Subject to section 6, no person may unfairly discriminate against any person on the ground of gender, 
including: 
(a) gender-based violence; 
(b)  female genital mutilation; 
(c)  the system of preventing women from inheriting family property; 
(d)  any practice, including traditional, customary or religious practice, which impairs the dignity of women 
and undermines equality between women and men, including the undermining of the dignity and well-
being of the girl child; 
(e)  any policy or conduct that unfairly limits access of women to land rights, finance, and other resources; 
(f)  discrimination on the ground of pregnancy; 
(g)  limiting women’s access to social services or benefits, such as health, education and social security; 
(h)  the denial of access to opportunities, including access to services or contractual opportunities for 
rendering services for consideration, or failing to take steps to reasonably accommodate the needs of 
such persons; 
(i)  systemic inequality of access to opportunities by women as a result of the sexual division of labour.’ 
 
Like racial discrimination, South Africa also has a long history of gender discrimination. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the Equality Act does not simply prohibit unfair 
discrimination on the basis of gender, but goes much further and prohibits several of the 
diverse ways in which gender discrimination manifest itself in society. It thus provides 




additional protection in relation to gender discrimination. The provisions of section 8(a)-(i) 
are fairly well understood in the context of South Africa and it is unnecessary to re-evaluate 
them in-depth.180 It is, however, submitted that the provisions of section 8(a) and (b) fit 
uncomfortably into unfair discrimination and would be better dealt with as forms of 
harassment. 
 
It is necessary to highlight the emphasis the drafters place on ‘females’, ‘women’ and ‘girls’ 
in section 8. Although the overall crime rate decreased between 2013/14 and 2016/17, violent 
crimes against women increased drastically between 2015/16 and 2016/17.181 In light of these 
facts, it is submitted that section 8 serves an important purpose. However, it can still be 
criticised on two grounds: 
• first, the legislation has a place in South Africa but the increase in crimes against 
women leaves it open to criticism that the law only exists in theory and is not actively 
achieving its purpose; and 
• second, the Constitution and other legislation (including the Equality Act) is often 
described as egalitarian in nature. Egalitarianism supports the equality of all people, 
without an emphasis on a particular group. 
 
Having addressed the initial point in the paragraph above, it is necessary to turn to the second 
point. Benatar in his book The Second Sexism illustrates some of the ways in which males are 
victims of disadvantage and discrimination.182 He acknowledges that sexism against women 
and girls is still a more severe problem in most parts of the world, but also argues that a more 
egalitarian viewpoint would be to also recognise the discrimination which befalls men and 
boys.183 Some examples which he discusses include male disadvantage in terms of child 
custody in divorce cases and paternity leave. He also cites relevant studies which illustrate 
that males are less likely to be treated leniently than females when being sentenced by a 
court.184 It is submitted that Benatar’s stance, although controversial, should be considered. 
                                                            
180 For a brief discussion of each provision see A Kok ‘The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act: why the controversy?’ (2001) 9 TSAR 297. See also GS Vogt ‘Non-discrimination on the 
Grounds of Race in South Africa– With Special Reference to the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of 
Unfair Discrimination Act’ (2001) 45 JAL 196.  
181 ‘Crime against women in South Africa’ (June 2018). Available at 
http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/Report-03-40-05/Report-03-40-05June2018.pdf, accessed on 13 May 
2019.  





According to an article published in 2018, 30% of South Africa’s women and 18% of its men 
have been victims of unwanted sexual advances in the workplace.185 It is submitted that by 
only emphasising the plight of women, the Equality Act violates the egalitarian values of the 
Constitution and this should be addressed. Reform of South African equality legislation is 
long overdue and in delaying such the legislature violates not only gender rights, but also the 
egalitarian values of the Constitution and democracy.  
 
In understanding section 8, it is important to understand the ground of gender and its relation 
to the ground of sex. Although Kentridge correctly argues that, in interpreting the Equality 
Act, rigid distinctions should not be observed as this could potentially exclude groups of 
people from the operation of the Equality Act, it is also necessary to highlight that this 
approach could potentially defeat the purpose of recognising sex and gender as separate 
grounds.186  
 
There are indeed differences between biological sex and the socio-cultural aspects of gender 
roles that are learned during social interaction. The biological difference between males and 
females is the most fundamental distinction in society.187 However, the dichotomy of 
‘maleness’ and ‘femaleness’ are largely determined by social perceptions and culture, rather 
than biology.188 Gender is a social construct which often filters into public policy and thus it 
is necessary for the policy to keep updated with the changes in society. Recent years have 
found great social awareness for gender identities which operate across a spectrum,189 rather 
than on a binary scale.190 The vulnerability of these gender identities to unfair discrimination 
are undeniable.191 Legislation is yet to respond to the need to understand and recognise these 
                                                            
185 A Kock ‘Gender discrimination and sexual harassment in the 21st century – What does the law say?’ 
(16 November 2018). Available at https://www.golegal.co.za/gender-discrimination-law/, accessed on 14 May 
2019. 
186 C Albertyn, B Goldblaat & C Roederer (eds) Introduction to the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of 
Unfair Discrimination Act, Act 4 of 2000 (2001) 61. 
187 Equality legislation drafting unit ‘Preliminary research reports and proposals regarding a framework on 
equality legislation for South Africa: discussion document 3’ (1998) 18. 
188 Ibid 18-19. 
189 These identities include: gender non-comformists, non-binary gender identities, and gender-fluid identities. 
190 See generally E Mamacos ‘Are South Africans ready for gender-neutral birth certificates?’ (30 April 2018). 
Available at https://www.w24.co.za/SelfCare/Wellness/Mind/are-south-africans-ready-for-gender-neutral-birth-
certificates-20180430, accessed on 13 May 2019.  
191 See SAHRC ‘Research Brief on Gender and Equality in South Africa 2013 - 2017’. Available at 
https://www.sahrc.org.za/home/21/files/RESEARCH%20BRIEF%20ON%20GENDER%20AND%20EQUALI
TY%20IN%20SOUTH%20AFRICA%202013%20to%202017.pdf, accessed on 27 August 2019. 
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identities in the interest of inclusivity and spirit of non-sexism and provide them with explicit 
legal protection.192  
 
Despite the failure on the part of legislation to respond to the aforementioned needs, 
judicially there appears to be progress in the understanding and appreciation of the sensitivity 
of gender minorities. In the case of September v Subramoney,193 the applicant was a 
transgender prisoner being held at a male prison in Caledon. She applied to the Western Cape 
High Court sitting as the Equality Court for an order the departments of Justice and 
Correctional Services to allow her to dress as a woman, even though she was in a male 
prison.194 September argued that she had been harassed by prison officials who forced her to 
dress and behave like a man. In support of her application, Lawyers for Human Rights also 
argued that the system had singled her out and subjected her to harassment and unfair 
discrimination which was in direct contradiction to the Equality Act. In response to these 
arguments, the defendants argued that in terms of the legal framework September was male 
and that her treatment had been consistent with that of other males. It followed, therefore, that 
she had not been harassed or unfairly discriminated against. In her reply, September argued 
that she did not need to undergo surgical transition to be defined as transgender because a 
person’s identity is subjective. The Equality Court found in favour of September and held 
that the actions of the departments amounted to unfair discrimination. Whilst the final 
decision itself is welcomed, the failure of the courts to comment on the binary system of 
gender recognition in South Africa has been heavily criticised.  
 
Regarding the above matter, De Vos has explicitly expressed support for September and 
criticised the legislation. He is further quoted as having said ‘while the Constitution and the 
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act do not explicitly prohibit 
unfair discrimination based on gender identity, they do allow courts to find there is 
discrimination on grounds that are similar to those listed. This is such a case’.195 It is 
submitted that although the courts may use alternate grounds to protect the interests of gender 
                                                            
192 See Kos and Others v Minister of Home Affairs and Others (2298/2017) [2017] ZAWCHC 90 at para 20, 
where the Court noted that ‘the literature on transgenderism describes that there is an all too common tendency 
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193 (EC10/2016) [2019] ZAEQC 4. 
194 ‘Who is Jade September, and why does she want to stay in a men’s prison?’ (27 December 2018). Available 
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minorities, the existence of a legislative gap can potentially be exploited. De Vos goes on to 
state that where discrimination occurs on gender identity, transgender individuals are a 
vulnerable group and the impact of the discrimination will be severe. It is submitted that this 
case is a clear indication of the Equality Act’s shortfall in responding to societies needs in 
relation to gender discrimination. Gender identities across the spectrum exist as an additional 
ground on which discrimination may occur and the Equality Act has failed to provide explicit 
adequate protection to those who may be affected. 
 
3.8 The prohibition of unfair discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation 
 
Although long-standing grounds of discrimination such as race, gender and disability persist, 
the changing nature of social relations over time have given rise to newer forms of 
discrimination, including on the basis of gender identity and sexual orientation.196 
Discrimination is thus a moving target that requires constant re-evaluation to ensure that 
everyone enjoys equal protection under any measures taken to combat discriminatory 
practices and achieve the goals of equality and dignity for all. Unlike race, gender and 
disability, sexual orientation is not given any additional protection by the Equality Act.  
Instead, the general prohibitions that operate in terms of sections 6, 10, and 11 apply to unfair 
discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation.197 
  
The concept of sexual orientation is not defined in the Equality Act itself but an article 
written by Justice Cameron states that ‘sexual orientation is defined by reference to erotic 
attraction: in the case of heterosexuals, to members of the opposite sex; in the case of gays 
and lesbians, to members of the same sex.  Potentially a homosexual or gay or lesbian person 
can therefore be anyone who is erotically attracted to members of his or her own sex’.198 It is 
submitted that ‘sexual orientation’ must be given a reasonably generous interpretation and 
                                                            
196 SAHRC ‘Research Brief on Gender and Equality in South Africa 2013 - 2017’. Available at 
https://www.sahrc.org.za/home/21/files/RESEARCH%20BRIEF%20ON%20GENDER%20AND%20EQUALI
TY%20IN%20SOUTH%20AFRICA%202013%20to%202017.pdf, accessed on 27 August 2019.  
197 The focus of this thesis on the prohibited ground of sexual orientation is necessary for purposes of the gap 
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198 E Cameron ‘Sexual Orientation and the Constitution:  A Test Case for Human Rights’ (1993) 110 SALJ 450. 
This definition was also used in the case of National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v 
Minister of Justice and Others 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC). 
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include the orientation of persons who are bi-sexual, transsexual and also persons whose 
sexual orientation fall on a spectrum, such as asexuals and pansexuals.199 
 
Despite the protection granted to the community by the Constitution and the Equality Act, 
40% of the LGBTQIAP+ community know someone who has been murdered for being or 
suspected of being a non-heterosexual.200 The hostility faced by the LGBTQIAP+ community 
can be traced back in part to the apartheid era of South Africa and thus exists as a tragic 
consequence of the system. When we consider the history of apartheid, two aspects come to 
mind: the state’s systematic institutionalisation of exclusionary and discriminatory structures 
through law; and, in the context of religious matters, a distinct bias in favour of 
Christianity.201  
 
During the apartheid era, section 20A(1) of the Sexual Offences Act202 criminalised any act 
between males at a party if such act was calculated to stimulate sexual passion or to give 
sexual gratification. This was punishable by a maximum fine of R4 000 or two years’ 
imprisonment or both.203 The Sexual Offences Act further prohibited ‘immoral or indecent’ 
acts between men and boys under the age of nineteen.204 In 1988 the prohibition of ‘immoral 
or indecent’ act was extended to include acts between women and girls under the age of 
nineteen.205 Discrimination against same-sex individuals was evident since the heterosexual 
age of consent was sixteen.206 It is submitted that this separation of the regulation of sexual 
acts as it existed in the apartheid era can be equated to the current Civil Union Act.207 It is 
further submitted that the creation of an apartheid-style separate ‘civil partnership’ for same-
sex couples confirms that the law does not consider such unions equal in status to those of 
                                                            
199 See also National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and Others 1999 
(1) SA 6 (CC) at para 21.  
200 M Morris ‘LGBT community still faces high levels of violence - report’ (04 December 2017). Available at 
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heterosexual partners. De Vos and Barnard criticise the Equality Act as a legislative insult to 
the LGBTQIAP+ community.208  
 
Believers of various religions209 strongly oppose the lifestyles of the LGBTQIAP+ 
community. Moreover, it is often contended that ‘homosexuality is a non-African social 
construct of the west’, and thus to engage in such conduct jeopardizes black community 
values.210 With regards to the former, the Constitutional Court has held that the religious 
beliefs of some cannot be used to determine the constitutional rights of others.211 The latter 
assertion is a rather contentious issue as contemporary anthropological studies prove that 
same sex relations have always existed in Africa.212 Nevertheless, challenges to a hetero-
sexist normative hierarchy are still met with violent contempt. According to a five-year report 
by the Hate Crimes Working Group, 35% of hate crimes reported come from the 
LGBTQIAP+ community making them the most discriminated against group in South 
Africa.213  
 
It is submitted that a revision of the legislation as it relates to affording equality and 
protection against unfair discrimination to LGBTQIAP+ individuals is required. As 
illustrated above, the community is currently placed in an exceptionally vulnerable position 
and the current legislative mechanisms are a feeble attempt to address the problem. 
Moreover, the sexual orientation of bisexual, asexual, and pansexual individuals should be 
given greater recognition and active undertakings are required to facilitate their inclusion in 
the legal, political and social sphere.  
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3.9 The prohibition of hate speech 
 
Apart from prohibiting unfair discrimination, section 10 of the Equality Act also prohibits 
hate speech on any of the prohibited grounds identified in section 1 of the Equality Act. This 
section provides that: 
 
‘Subject to the proviso in section 12, no person may publish, propagate, advocate or communicate words based 
on one or more of the prohibited grounds, against any person, that could reasonably be construed to demonstrate 
a clear intention to: 
(a)  be hurtful; 
(b)  be harmful or to incite harm;  
(c)  promote or propagate hatred.’ 
 
The proviso to section 12 states that: 
 
‘bona fide engagement in artistic creativity, academic or scientific inquiry, fair and accurate reporting in the 
public interest or publication of any information, advertisement or notice in accordance with section 16 of the 
Constitution, is not precluded by this section’. 
  
A careful examination of section 10 read with the proviso to section 12 demonstrates that 
publishing, propagating, advocating or communicating ‘words’ is prohibited if: 
• they are based on one or more of the prohibited grounds listed in the Equality Act; 
• they are objectively considered to be hurtful, harmful, incite harm or propagate hatred 
(the intention of the person who utters the words is irrelevant); and 
• they do not fall into the proviso to section 12. In other words, they are not 
communicated for the purpose of bona fide artistic creativity, academic and scientific 
inquiry and the like.214  
 
As the points set out above illustrate, the scope and ambit of section 10 is very wide. It has, 
therefore, been criticised for going far beyond the scope of section 16(2) of the Constitution, 
which excludes hate speech from the scope and ambit of the right to freedom of expression 
guaranteed in section 16(1).215 This criticism is based on a number of grounds.  
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One of these is that the Equality Act prohibits what has been termed ‘harmful conduct in the 
air’.216 This means that words can constitute hate speech if construed by another as being 
offensive even if the person towards whom the offending words were directed at remains 
unaffected.  
 
Another criticism is that the phrase ‘that could reasonably be construed to demonstrate a 
clear intention’ is much broader than the section 16(2) of the Constitution which prohibits 
only actual incitement.217 Furthermore, it is contended that the term ‘hurtful’ can have far-
reaching consequences and is significantly wider than the section 16(2) harm.218  
 
The scope of section 10 is also much wider than that of section 16(2). Hate speech under the 
Constitution is restricted to four prohibited grounds namely, race, religion, ethnicity and 
gender, whilst the Equality Act hate speech extends to all of the prohibited grounds listed 
under section one. An important question that arises is whether section 16(2) can be 
interpreted to encompass the additional prohibited grounds referred to in section 10(1). If it 
can, then the additional prohibited grounds referred to in section 10(1) do not infringe section 
16(1) of the Constitution and do not have to be justified in terms of the limitation clause. If it 
cannot, then the additional prohibited grounds referred to in section 10(1) do infringe section 
16(1) and will have to be justified in terms of the limitation clause. 
 
Teichner points out that two opposing arguments may be made in this respect. On the one 
hand, it could be argued that section 16(2) must be interpreted to encompass the additional 
prohibited grounds referred to in section 10(1) because the courts are required to interpret the 
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(c) freedom of artistic creativity; and 
(d) academic freedom and freedom of scientific research. 
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cause harm’. 
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217 AB Hatchet Hate speech in South Africa: What our Constitution demands (Unpublished Thesis, University 
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Bill of Rights in a manner that promotes the values that underlie an open and democratic 
society and the prohibition of hate speech on the additional prohibited grounds does exactly 
that. On the other hand, it could be argued that section 16(2) must be interpreted not to 
encompass the additional prohibited grounds referred to in section 10(1) because the drafters 
of the Constitution deliberately restricted the scope of section 16(2) to race, religion, ethnicity 
and gender in order to protect the sanctity of the right to freedom of expression.219 
 
It is submitted that the latter approach is to be the preferred. This is because the additional 
prohibited grounds referred to in section 10 of the Equality Act are very wide and 
consequently do have the potential to make serious inroads into the right to freedom of 
expression. They should, therefore, be subject to the strict standards of review provided in the 
limitation clause. 
 
Although the Supreme Court of Appeal appears to have accepted the former argument in 
Qwelane v South African Human Rights Commission,220 it still went on to find that section 
10(1) of the Equality Act unjustifiably infringes the right to freedom of expression 
guaranteed in section 16(1) and, consequently, was unconstitutional and invalid. 
 
In this case, the appellant – who was a well-known journalist and anti-apartheid activist – 
published a homophobic opinion piece in a national tabloid newspaper called the Sunday Sun. 
After the opinion piece was published, the SAHRC instituted proceedings against the 
appellant in the Equality Court. It sought an order declaring that the appellant’s opinion piece 
infringed section 10(1) of the Equality Act because it was hurtful, incited harm and 
propagated hatred against homosexuals and thus constituted hate speech on the prohibited 
ground of sexual orientation. The appellant then applied to the High Court for an order 
declaring section 10(1) read together with section 1 and section 12 to be unconstitutional and 
invalid on the grounds that it was vague and overbroad and thus unjustifiably infringed the 
right to freedom of expression guaranteed in section 16(1) of the Constitution. After both 
cases were consolidated into a single hearing, the Equality Court/High Court dismissed the 
constitutional challenge and found that the opinion piece did constitute hate speech and, 
consequently, that the appellant had infringed section 10(1). 
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After the Equality Court/High Court handed down its decision, the appellant appealed to the 
Supreme Court of Appeal. This time the Court accepted the appellant’s argument that section 
10(1) of the Equality Act was vague and overbroad and thus unjustifiably infringed section 
16(1) of the Constitution. In arriving at this decision, the Court began by pointing out that if 
the speech prohibited by section 10(1) of the Equality Act fell into the four corners of section 
16(2)(c) of the Constitution, it was not protected by section 16(1) and the prohibition in 
section 10(1) did not infringe section 16(1). The opposite was also true. If the speech 
prohibited by section 10(1) did not fall into section 16(2)(c), it was protected by section 16(1) 
and the prohibition in section 10(1) did infringe section 16(1) and would have to be justified 
in terms of the limitation clause. The first issue that had to be determined, therefore, was 
whether the speech prohibited by section 10(1) fell inside or outside section 16(2)(c). 
 
Insofar as this issue was concerned, the appellant argued that section 10(1) of the Equality 
Act did fall outside section 16(2)(c) of the Constitution for three reasons. 
 
First, while section 16(2)(c) prohibited expression that advocated hatred based only on race, 
ethnicity, gender and religion, section 10(1) went further and prohibited speech that 
advocated hatred based on the additional characteristics listed in section 1 of the Equality 
Act, including sexual orientation.221 Although sexual orientation was not one of the 
characteristics listed in section 16(2)(c), the Supreme Court of Appeal held, the Constitution 
imposed an obligation on the state to protect LGBTQIAP+ people against speech which 
advocated hatred on the basis of sexual orientation. Given this obligation, it could not be said 
that section 10(1) fell outside section 16(2)(c) simply because it prohibited speech that 
advocated hatred on the basis of sexual orientation.222 
 
Second, while section 16(2)(c) prohibited expression on the narrow grounds that it 
‘advocated hatred’ and ‘constituted incitement to cause harm’, section 10(1) went further and 
prohibited speech on the broad grounds that that could ‘reasonably be construed to 
demonstrate a clear intention to (a) be hurtful, (b) be harmful or to incite harm, or (c) promote 
or propagate hatred’.223 Apart from the fact that the grounds set out in paragraphs (a), (b) and 
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(c) of section 10(1) had to be read disjunctively and, therefore, were wider than those set out 
in section 16(2)(c),224 the Supreme Court of Appeal held, the words ‘reasonably be 
construed’ also replaced the stricter objective test in section 16(2)(c) with a more lenient 
subjective one in section 10(1). Given that these differences were extensive, it followed that 
section 10(1) fell outside section 16(2)(c).225 
 
Third, while section 16(2)(c) prohibited expression that ‘[advocated] hatred’ and 
‘constitute[d] incitement to cause harm’,  section 10(1) went further and prohibited speech 
that ‘published, propagated, advocated and communicated not only ‘hatred’ and ‘incitement 
to cause harm’, but also speech that was ‘hurtful’.226 The problem with including speech that 
was hurtful in section 10(1), the Supreme Court of Appeal held, is that the word hurtful refers 
primarily to hurt emotions and feeling and does not rise to the level of harm or hate.227 In 
addition, it is accepted in most comparable foreign jurisdictions and by South African 
commentators that the right to freedom of speech should include words that are hurtful or 
offensive. In light of these findings, it followed once again that section 10(1) fell outside 
section 16(2)(c).228 
 
After finding that section 10(1) of the Equality Act did fall outside section 16(2) of the 
Constitution and, consequently, that it infringed section 16(1), the Supreme Court of Appeal 
turned to consider whether this infringement could be justified. After a careful examination of 
the approach followed in comparable foreign jurisdictions, the Court found that it could not 
and declared section 10(1) to be unconstitutional and invalid. 
 
The hate speech provisions under the Equality Act are often referred to as being three-fold. 
Sections 10 and 12 are joined by section 7(a), which prohibits racist speech as a form of 
unfair discrimination. This section forms part of the unfair discrimination prohibition under 
the Equality Act, thus illustrating the intersection between hate speech and unfair 
discrimination. The fact that the Equality Act deals with unfair discrimination and hate 
speech as separate concepts means that it recognises a distinction between these concepts, but 
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still acknowledges the connection insofar as they turn on the impairment of the dignity 
interest in violating the equality right.229 
 
3.10 The prohibition of harassment 
 
Harassment is prohibited in section 11 of the Equality Act. This very short section simply 
provides that ‘no person may subject any person to harassment.’ This section must be read 
together with the definition of harassment in section 1 of the Equality Act. Section 1 defines 
harassment as: 
 
‘unwanted conduct which is persistent or serious and demeans, humiliates or creates a hostile or intimidating 
environment or is calculated to induce submission by actual or threatened adverse consequences and which is 
related to: 
(a)  sex, gender or sexual orientation, or  
(b)  a person's membership or presumed membership of a group identified by one or more of the prohibited 
grounds or a characteristic associated with such group.’ 
 
As Albertyn et al point out, this definition may be reduced to three essential elements, 
namely: 
• unwanted persistent or serious conduct, 
• which negatively impacts a person, and  
• is related to one of the prohibited grounds.230  
 
Although harassment is also prohibited by the Employment Equity Act231 and the Domestic 
Violence Act,232 section 11 goes much further than both of these statutes and extends 
harassment beyond the confines of employment and domestic relations.233 It also 
acknowledges the serious nature of harassment by dispensing with the narrow requirement of 
‘a pattern’ as is required by the Domestic Violence Act.  
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The term ‘conduct’ in the definition of harassment should be interpreted broadly to include 
verbal, physical, suggestive and other gestures.234 In order to constitute harassment, however, 
these different forms of conduct must be ‘unwanted’. This means that a complainant must 
have communicated, in some way, to the alleged harasser that the words or actions are 
unwelcomed.235 When it comes to defining the concept of ‘unwanted’ conduct, some 
assistance may be derived from the Code of Good Practice on the Handling of Sexual 
Harassment Cases in the Workplace.236 According to the Code, there are different ways of 
communicating one’s disapproval which include subtle measures such as ‘walking away or 
not responding to the perpetrator’.237 The Code also allows for the communication of the 
disapproval through a third party.238  
 
Apart from being unwanted, the Equality Act provides that the conduct in question must also 
be persistent or serious in order for it to constitute harassment. As Albertyn et al correctly 
point out, the term ‘serious’ is value-laden and each individual person’s subjective experience 
must be assessed so as to not perpetuate stereotypes.239 This interpretation is also supported 
by Kruger.240 
 
The definition of harassment also requires that the conduct in question demeans, humiliates, 
or creates a hostile or intimidating environment or is calculated to induce submission by 
actual or threatened adverse consequences related to the prohibited grounds.241 This 
requirement captures the impairment of dignity as a shared feature between harassment and 
unfair discrimination.242   
 
Garbers criticises this provision of the Equality Act on the ground it incorporates perspectives 
of the complainant (‘demeans’ and ‘humiliates’), on the one hand, whilst requiring intention 
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to harass (‘calculated to induce’), on the other.243 It is submitted that this criticism is 
misplaced as the implications of the text are clear. The court has to combine a subjective and 
an objective approach in which the subjective feelings and experiences of the complainant 
have to be given consideration whilst balanced against an objective assessment of the 
conduct.244 
 
The scope and ambit of harassment was considered by the Equality Court in Sonke Gender 
Justice Network v Malema.245 In this case, the respondent gave a public address at the Cape 
Peninsula Technikon in Cape Town. During this address he made the following statement:  
 
‘When a woman didn't enjoy it, she leaves early in the morning. Those who had a nice time will wait until the 
sun comes out, requests breakfast and taxi money. In the morning that lady requested breakfast and taxi money. 
You don't ask for taxi money from somebody who raped you.’246  
 
After making this statement, the respondent was accused of hate speech and harassment by 
the complainant. In his defence, the respondent argued that his statement was not offensive to 
gender equality and neither did it amount to hate speech or harassment. Instead, it constituted 
fair comment and was thus protected by section 12 of the Equality Act.  
 
The Equality Court rejected these arguments and found in favour of the complainant. It began 
its analysis by examining whether the respondent’s statement amounted to hate speech and, 
after finding that it did, whether it also amounted to harassment. Insofar as this aspect was 
concerned, the Court relied heavily on the evidence given by Ms Lisa Vetten, who was called 
as an expert witness for the complainant.  
 
In her evidence, Ms Vetten testified that ‘the comments made by the Respondent rely upon 
generalisations about women, rape and consent which reinforce rape myths and that he is 
abrogating to himself the prerogative of deciding what does and does not constitute rape. 
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Myths and stereotypes are typically created by groups dominant in society. Thus, when men 
proclaim what is and is not sexual violence, and justify their reasoning with rape myths, they 
reinforce men's dominance and perspectives at the expense of women equality.’247  
 
In light of this expert evidence, the Equality Court found that the respondent’s statement 
clearly demeaned and humiliated women and especially rape survivors, that it did so on the 
grounds of gender and/or sex and that it was serious. It could, therefore, be classified as a 
form of harassment. The Court thus ordered the respondent to make a public apology and to 
pay damages in the amount of R50 000 to the People Opposed to Women Abuse (POWA).248 
 
The prohibition of harassment in the Equality Act has been enhanced by the enactment of the 
Protection from Harassment Act.249 According to its long title and preamble, the purpose of 
this Act is to provide persons who are suffering from harassment with an effective remedy by 
entitling them to apply to a magistrates’ court for a protection order against harassment. The 
notion of ‘harassment’ is defined very broadly in section 1 of the Act as conduct that causes 
harm250 or inspires a reasonable belief that harm may be caused to the complainant or a 
related person,251 or that amounts to sexual harassment of the complainant or a related person.  
 
Conduct that causes harm or inspires a reasonable belief that harm may be caused, occurs 
when the respondent unreasonably:  
(i)  follows, watches, pursues or accosts the complainant or a related person or loiters 
outside of or near the place where the complainant or a related person resides, studies 
or works; 
(ii)  communicates with the complainant or a related person, either verbally or 
electronically,  irrespective of whether a conversation ensues; or 
(iii)  sends, delivers or causes the delivery of letters, telegrams, packages, facsimiles, 
electronic mails or other objects to the complainant or a related person or leaves them 
where they will be found by or given to the complainant or a related person.252 
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Conduct that amounts to sexual harassment occurs when the respondent: 
(i)  pays unwelcome sexual attention to the complainant or a related person and knows or 
who should reasonably know that it is unwelcome; 
(ii)  engages in unwelcome behaviour of a sexual nature, or makes unwelcome 
suggestions, messages or remarks of a sexual nature, to the complainant or a related 
person and which objectively offend, intimidate or humiliate the complainant or a 
related person; 
(iii)  promises the complainant or a related person a reward for complying with a sexually 
orientated request; or  threatens the complainant or a related person with reprisal for 
refusing to comply with a sexually orientated request.253 
 
3.11 The promotion of equality 
 
Apart from preventing, prohibiting and eliminating unfair discrimination, hate speech and 
harassment, the Equality Act is also aimed at promoting equality. The provisions regulating 
the promotion of equality are set out in Chapter Five of the Equality Act. This Chapter is 
divided into six sections (section 24 to 29). 
 
Section 24 begins by imposing a general duty on the state and private persons to promote 
and, in the case of the state, to achieve equality. The duty imposed on the state is set out in 
more detail in section 25, while the duty imposed on private persons is set out in more detail 
in section 26 (although these provisions apply only to those private persons who are operating 
in the public sector). Section 28 sets out special measures to promote equality with regard to 
race, gender and disability and section 29 contains an illustrative list of unfair practices in 
certain sectors. 
 
The concept of ‘equality’ is defined in section 1 of the Equality Act, which states that 
equality encompasses the ‘full and equal enjoyment of rights and freedoms as contemplated 
in the Constitution and includes de jure and de facto equality and also equality in terms of 
outcomes’.254 This definition encompasses the concept of substantive equality. A substantive 
approach to equality takes cognisance of the context in which a litigant asks a court for 
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assistance by analysing the position of a particular litigant in society, the group to which he 
belongs and the history of the particular disadvantage. This approach emphasises the need, 
not only to abolish discriminatory laws but also to actively remedy disadvantage and to 
redistribute social, economic and political power.255  
 
The South African Human Rights Commission plays an important role in monitoring the duty 
to promote equality. It is empowered to request information from the state or any person on 
any measures relating to the achievement of equality, including the extent of their compliance 
with legislation and codes of practice and it may assist complainants, conduct investigations 
and make recommendations to Equality Courts.256 
 
When applying the Equality Act, Equality Courts must have regard to section 5 of the Act 
which deals with the application of the Act. Section 5 provide in this respect as follows:  
 
‘(1)  This Act binds the State and all persons. 
(2)   If any conflict relating to a matter dealt with in this Act arises between this Act and the provisions of 
any other law, other than the Constitution or an Act of Parliament expressly amending this Act, the 
provisions of this Act must prevail. 
(3)  This Act does not apply to any person to whom and to the extent to which the Employment Equity Act, 
1998 (Act No. 55 of 1998), applies.’ 
 
It is important to note that despite the emphasis placed on the state and private persons 
operating in the public sector, section 5 makes it clear that the provisions of the Equality Act 
apply to ‘all persons’, apart from those governed by the Employment Equity Act. The 
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This chapter sought to provide a background as to the objectives and relevant provisions of 
the Equality Act. Almost two decades since its inception, the Equality Act is yet to undergo 
any reform to address the ever-changing needs of society. Given South Africa’s history, it is 
unlikely that legislation alone can cure a social illness but the mechanisms created under the 
Equality Act are a commendable effort which, once effectively revised and utilised, will yield 
promising results. The guarantee of democratic tolerance for all South Africans, however, 




CHAPTER FOUR: THE EQUALITY COURT 
 
‘The judicial system is the most expensive machine ever invented for finding out what 




Apart from promoting equality and preventing unfair discrimination, the Equality Act also 
establishes Equality Courts, makes provision for the appointment of presiding officers and 
clerks of these courts and regulates their procedures, powers and functions. The decision to 
establish Equality Courts may be traced back to concerns about the accessibility of aggrieved 
persons to judicial structures in order to adjudicate matters.258 When establishing the Equality 
Courts, a number of considerations were taken into consideration. Among these were the 
potential for equality issues to be marginalised if existing courts were completely excluded, 
the cost of introducing an entirely new system of courts, the need to separate of the 
investigation and adjudication of complaints and the accommodation of appeal procedures.259  
 
The Equality Act anticipated and addressed these concerns by introducing the Equality 
Courts as an inexpensive tool to be used in the achievement of equality and the eradication of 
unfair discrimination. The Act also requires a more active role by presiding officers while 
simplifying the procedure that have to be followed by litigants. This chapter seeks to provide 
a brief background to the Equality Courts while analysing and commenting on the role of 
such structures. 
 
4.2 The Equality Courts  
 
Although their purpose is to interpret and apply the provisions of the Equality Act, the 
Equality Courts are not special courts envisaged in section 166(e) of the Constitution. This is 
because the Act has not created an entirely new court. Instead, it has simply extended the 
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jurisdiction of the High Court of South Africa and selected Magistrates’ Courts to adjudicate 
complaints that arise under the scope of the Act.  
 
As the points set out above indicate, the Equality Act has adopted a broad approach towards 
the High Court and simply designated ‘every High Court [as] an equality court for the area of 
its jurisdiction’. Unfortunately, it has not adopted the same broad approach towards the 
Magistrates’ Courts. Instead, it makes provision for a somewhat complex process in terms of 
which selected Magistrates’ Courts must be designated as Equality Courts. 
 
Section 16 of the Equality Act begins in this respect by providing that every High Court is an 
Equality Court in its area of jurisdiction.260 Magistrates’ Courts, however, are selectively 
designated as Equality Courts by the Minister of Justice.261 This means that the High Court 
and select Magistrates’ Courts designated as Equality Courts are conferred with extended 
jurisdictional powers in relation to equality matters.262 The decision of the Minister in relation 
to the appointment and jurisdiction of Magistrates’ Courts as Equality Courts is not finite and 
may be amended when necessary.263  
 
Despite the intricacies involved with appointing functioning Equality Courts, substantial 
progress has been made in this respect. In 2019, for example, the Department of Justice and 
Constitutional Development reported that a total of 383 Magistrates’ Courts had been 
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4.3 The presiding officers of the Equality Court  
 
Given that it has not established an entirely new court, it is not surprising that the Equality 
Act also provides that the Equality Court must be staffed by existing judges and magistrates. 
This does not mean, however, that every judge or magistrate who is on active duty is 
automatically qualified to serve as an Equality Court judge.265 
 
Insofar as judges are concerned, the Equality Act provides that ‘any judge may be designated 
in writing by a Judge President as a presiding officer of the Equality Court of the area in 
respect of which he or she is a judge’.266 Insofar as magistrates are concerned, the Act 
distinguishes between district magistrates and regional magistrates who adjudicate civil 
matters. 
 
Insofar as district magistrates are concerned, the Equality Act provides that the ‘head of an 
administrative region’ must ‘designate in writing any magistrate or additional magistrate as a 
presiding officer of the Equality Court.267 An ‘administrative region’ is group of District 
Magistrates’ Courts that have been joined together by the Minister of Justice for 
administrative purposes.268 
 
Insofar as regional magistrates who adjudicate civil matters are concerned, the Equality Act 
provides that the magistrate at the head of a regional division established for the purposes of 
adjudicating civil matters must designate in writing any such magistrate as a presiding officer 
of the Equality Court.269  
 
Besides conferring the power on Judges President, the heads of administrative regions and the 
heads of regional divisions adjudicating civil matters to appoint presiding officers, the 
Equality Act also imposes an obligation on them to do so. In this respect it provides that 
Judges President and the heads of administrative regions must take all reasonable steps within 
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available resources to designate at least one presiding officer for each equality court within 
his or her area of jurisdiction.270 
 
A presiding officer must perform the functions and duties and exercise the powers assigned to 
or conferred on him or her under this Act or any other law.271 
 
4.4 The clerks of the Equality Court  
 
Apart from presiding officers, the Equality Act also makes provision for the appointment of 
clerks of the Equality Court as well as for their powers and functions.  
 
Insofar as their appointment is concerned, section 17 of the Equality Act provides that ‘the 
Director-General of the Department of Justice may, for every Equality Court, appoint or 
designate one or more officers in the [Department of Justice], or may appoint one or more 
persons in the prescribed manner and on the prescribed conditions, as clerks of the Equality 
Court.272 
 
Before a person may be appointed as a clerk of the Equality Court, however, he or she must 
‘complete a training course as clerk of an Equality Court’.273 This training course must be 
developed and implemented by the Director-General with a view to building a dedicated and 
experienced pool of trained and specialist clerks.274 
 
In order to achieve this goal the specialised training must provide social context training and 
uniform norms, standards and procedures which must be observed in the performance of 
functions in terms of the Act, by providing social context training for presiding officers and 
uniform norms, standards and procedures to be observed by presiding officers in the 
performance of their functions and duties and in the exercise of their powers.275 
 
                                                            
270 Section 16(1)(3). 
271 Section 16(5). 
272 Section 17(1)(a). 
273 Section 17(2). 
274 Section 31(6). The Director-General must compile and keep a list of every officer or person who has 




The overarching role of the clerks is to assist the Equality Courts to which they are attached 
to perform their functions. Apart from this general role, the Equality Act provides that the 
clerks must also perform the specific functions that may be prescribed by the Minister.276 
Specific functions have in fact been prescribed by the Minister and may be found in the 





As pointed out above, one of the reasons for establishing Equality Courts is to broaden access 
to the courts. Given this goal, it is not surprising that the Equality Act has taken a generous 
approach to standing. It thus provides that proceedings under the Act may be instituted by a 
wide range of persons. These are as follows:  
 
First, a person acting in his or her own interest.278 A person who alleges that their interest has 
been infringed through any of the prohibited actions listed in the Equality Act would be 
granted standing. Although no proof of the infringement is necessary, sufficient information 
must be placed before the court to substantiate the allegation.279 
 
Second, a person acting on behalf of someone who cannot act in his or her own name.280 The 
Equality Act provides little guidance as to how a complainant should proceed when acting on 
behalf of another. It is suggested that a person laying a complaint in terms of the Act on 
behalf of another must satisfy the requirements set out by the Supreme Court of Appeal in 
Wood v Ondangwa Tribal Authority.281 
 
                                                            
276 Section 17(1)(a). 
277 See Regulation 5 of the Regulations Relating to the Promotion of Equality and the Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination GN R764, GG 25065 (13 June 2003). Some of the functions are set out later in this chapter.  
278 Section 20(1)(a). 
279 R Kruger Racism and law: Implementing the right to equality in selected South African equality courts 
(Unpublished Thesis, Rhodes University, 2008) 229. 
280 Section 20(1)(b).  
281 Wood v Ondangwa Tribal Authority 1975 (2) SA 294 (A) at para 311E-F and 311H-312A. In this case the 
Court held that the person acting on behalf of another must place information before the court which sets out the 
reasons for the other person’s inability to act in his or her own interest and that such a person has consented to 
the proceedings or would have consented had s/he been able to do so and/or has lodged or would have lodged 
the complaint had he or she been able to do so. 
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Third, a person acting on behalf of or in the interests of a group or association.282 In order to 
act on behalf of a group, notification must be given to the members of the group as well as 
the option to ‘opt out’. In addition, sufficient information to identify the class members must 
be placed before the court.283  
 
Fourth, any person acting in the public interest.284 When a person claims to be acting in 
public interest, the basis is wider than in the instance of a class action.285 In Ferreira v Levin 
NO and others286 O’Regan J put forward a list of factors to be considered when determining 
whether a person is genuinely acting in the public interest. These factors are as follows:  
• whether there is another reasonable and effective manner in which the challenge can 
be brought; 
• the nature of the relief sought and the extent to which the relief is of general and 
prospective application; 
• the range of persons or groups directly or indirectly affected by any order of the court; 
and  
• the opportunities the persons or groups had to present evidence before the court.287 
 
Fifth, any association acting in the interests of its members.288 Any voluntary association, 
even an association without legal personality can show in relation to the Equality Act that it is 
acting on behalf of its members.289 This broad basis for standing is supported by the 
definition of ‘person’ in section 1 of the Act which includes ‘non-juristic entities’.  
 
Last, the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) and the Commission for 
Gender Equality (CGE).290 These two institutions have special roles to play in the eradication 
of inequality and discrimination. These bodies may act as litigants or provide legal 
representation.291  
                                                            
282 Section 20(1)(c).  
283 R Kruger Racism and law: Implementing the right to equality in selected South African equality courts 
(Unpublished Thesis, Rhodes University, 2008) 230. 
284 Section 20(1)(d).  
285 I Currie & J De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 5 ed (2005) 89-90. 
286 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC) at para 234. 
287 In Lawyers for Human Rights v Minister of Home Affairs 2004 (4) SA 125 (CC) this list was approved, but 
Yacoob J noted that other factors may also be considered (para 18).  
288 Section 20(1)(e). 
289 Highveldridge Residents Concerned Party v Highveldrigde TLC 2006 (6) SA 66 (T) at para 25. 
290 Section 20(1)(f). 




A careful examination of section 20(1) of the Equality Act, shows that the drafters relied 
heavily on section 38 of the Constitution (the Bill of Rights standing clause).292 There are, 
however, important differences between the approach taken towards standing by the Equality 
Act and the Constitution. Perhaps the most significant is that while a person who wishes to 
enforce the Bill of Rights must not only allege that a right in the Bill of Rights has been 
infringed or threatened, but must also demonstrate a sufficient interest in the remedy sought 
with reference to the categories listed,293 a person who wishes to enforce the Equality Act 
simply has to demonstrate an interest in the matter with reference to the categories listed.294 A 
person who wishes to enforce the Equality Act, therefore, does not have to establish standing 
in relation to the requested remedy. This is a relaxation of the requirements under the 
Constitution.295 With regards to this broad standing, Currie and De Waal note that the Bill of 
Rights has introduced a generous approach.296 This is further supported in the case of 
Ferreira v Levin NO,297 where Chaskalson P said the following:  
 
‘I can see no good reason for adopting a narrow approach to the issue of standing in constitutional cases. On the 
contrary, it is my view that we should rather adopt a broad approach to standing. This would be consistent with 
the mandate given to this Court to uphold the Constitution and would serve to ensure that constitutional rights 
enjoy the full measure of the protection to which they are entitled’.298  
 
Thus, given the nature of the protected interest i.e. the rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights, 
the liberal approach to grant standing to a wider range of persons is a necessary step in 
achieving the greater purpose of the Equality Act and in upholding the Constitution itself.  
 
 
                                                            
292 Section 38 lists the following categories:  
(1) persons acting in their own interests; 
(2) persons acting on behalf of another who cannot act in his/her own name;  
(3) persons acting as a member, or in the interest of a group or class of persons;  
(4) persons acting in the public interest; and 
(5) an association acting in the interest of its members. 
293 R Kruger Racism and law: Implementing the right to equality in selected South African equality courts 
(Unpublished Thesis, Rhodes University, 2008) 228. 
294 Ibid.  
295 The deviation from the constitutional norm can be excused based on the need for ease of accessibility to the 
Equality Courts.   
296 I Currie & J De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 5 ed (2005) 75. 
297 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC). 





Apart from adopting a generous approach towards standing, the Equality Act also seeks to 
promote access to the Equality Court by allowing complainants to appear without legal 
representation.299 However, if a party wishes to be represented, regulation 10(9) extends the 
traditional realms of representative power to an attorney, an advocate or to any person of 
choice. This allows lay-persons to provide representation. In so doing, access to justice is 
afforded to many poor litigants who do not qualify for legal aid, those unaware of the role of 
the SAHRC or CGE in representation, and/or those who do not wish to obtain legal 
representation.300 As the Department of Justice itself states, however, such persons should be 
advised and encouraged to seek assistance from the SAHRC and the CGE as these bodies 
have been established in terms of the Constitution to ‘assist complainants in bringing 





Besides identifying the categories of persons who may institute proceedings, the Equality Act 
also prescribes the manner in which a complaint may be lodged. It provides in this respect 
that a complainant must, in the prescribed manner, notify the clerk of the Equality Clerk of 
his or her intention to do so.302  
 
The manner in which a complainant must notify the clerk has in fact been prescribed by the 
Minister and may be found in the Regulations Relating to the Promotion of Equality and 
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination.  
 
These regulations provide that the complainant must complete a complaint form.303 In this 
form, the complainant must set out his or her particulars and those of the respondent; state 
how the infringement has affected her or him; and provide particulars of and attach any 
                                                            
299 Department of Justice and Constitutional Development ‘Equality Courts’. Available at 
http://www.justice.gov.za/EQCact/eqc_faq.html, accessed on 28 June 2019. 
300 R Kruger Racism and law: Implementing the right to equality in selected South African equality courts 
(Unpublished Thesis, Rhodes University, 2008) 233. 
301 Ibid.  
302 Section 20(2).  
303 Regulation 6(1).  
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documents which substantiate the complaint. The complainant must also indicate the remedy 
he or she is seeking.304 
 
The clerk of the Equality Court is expected to provide assistance to complainants by 
providing them with information regarding the Equality Act and the procedure of the 
Equality Courts. Within seven days of receiving a complaint, the clerk must notify the 
respondent, who has 10 days to respond.305 If the respondent exercises his or her right to 
reply, the clerk must send a copy of this reply to the complainant within seven days.306  
 
The clerk must also refer the matter to the presiding officer who must decide if the matter 
should be heard in the Equality Court or referred to an alternative forum.307 In making this 
decision the presiding officer must take into account:  
• the personal circumstances of the parties and particularly the complainant; 
• the physical accessibility of any contemplated alternative forum; 
• the needs and wishes of the parties and particularly the complainant; 
• the nature of the intended proceedings and whether the outcome of the proceedings 
could facilitate the development of judicial precedent and jurisprudence in this area of 
the law; and 
• the views of the appropriate functionary at any contemplated alternative forum.308 
 
If the matter is referred to an alternative forum, all the information must be presented to that 
forum to allow it to hear the matter within a reasonable time.309 If the matter is not referred to 
an alternative forum, the presiding officer must refer it back to the clerk to assign a date for 
the ‘direction hearing’.310  
 
                                                            
304 Ibid.  
305 Western Cape Government ‘Equality Courts’. Available at https://www.westerncape.gov.za/node/51896, 
accessed on 28 June 2019. 
306 Ibid.  
307 Section 20(3). 
308 Section 20(4).  
309 Regulation 6(7). See also Western Cape Government ‘Equality Courts’. Available at 
https://www.westerncape.gov.za/node/51896, accessed on 28 June 2019. 
310 Section 20(3)(b). 
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The direction hearing allows the parties and the Equality Court to map the way forward in 
relation to the complaint.311 The presiding officer will establish what is not in dispute; explain 
to the parties what is going to happen; determine if an interpreter is needed; and set a date for 
trial.312 
 
At the trial, the burden is on the complainant to prove his or her case on a balance of 
probabilities. If the complainant is successful, he or she is entitled to a remedy.313 The sorts 
of remedies that the Equality Court may make are set out in section 21 of the Equality Act 
itself. 
 
A decision made by an Equality Courts may be taken on appeal either to the High Court or 
the Supreme Court of Appeal.314 Regulation 19(1) provides that the appeal must be made 
within 14 days of the order by delivery of a notice of appeal to both the clerk and the 
complainant or the respondent, as the case may be. The notice of appeal must be completed in 
writing and:  
• state whether the whole or only a specific part of the order is being appealed against; 
• set out fully the finding of fact or the ruling of law appealed against; and 
• where appropriate, set out the order or orders or part thereof against which the appeal 
is directed and the grounds on which the appeal is founded.315 
                                                            
311 R Kruger ‘Small Steps to Equal Dignity: The Work of the South African Equality Courts’ (2011) 7 The 
Equal Rights Review 30. 
312 Western Cape Government ‘Equality Courts’. Available at https://www.westerncape.gov.za/node/51896, 
accessed on 28 June 2019. These are not the only powers of the presiding officer at the directions hearing. 
Regulation 10(5)(c) states that the presiding officer may make an order in respect of: 
(i) discovery, inspection and exchange of documents; 
(ii) interrogatories; 
(iii) admission of facts or of documents; 
(iv) the limiting of disputes; 
(v) the joinder of parties; 
(vi) amicus curiae interventions; 
(vii) the manner of service of documents not provided for in the regulations; 
(viiii) amendments; 
(ix) the filing of affidavits; 
(x) the giving of further particulars; 
(xi) the place and time of future hearings; 
(xii) procedures to be followed in respect of urgent matters; and 
(xiii) the giving of evidence at the hearing, including whether evidence of witnesses in chief is to be given orally 
or by affidavit, or both. 
313 The remedies are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6.  
314 Section 23. 
315 Regulation 19(2)(a)-(d).  
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Once the appeal has been noted, it will be conducted under the ordinary rules of appeal. In 
other words, the court will act as a court of appeal and not as an Equality Court.316 The appeal 
court can make any such order as it may deem fit.317 
 
Sections 23(3) and 23(4) of the Equality Act allow for appeals to be taken directly to the 
Constitutional Court. Appeals to the Constitutional Court are instituted by the Minister for 
cases where there exists some conflict in the interpretation of ‘prohibited grounds’ or other 
ambiguous provisions of the Act.318 
 
4.8 Alternative forums 
 
The Equality Courts are one of several institutions that have jurisdiction to hear complaints 
arising under the Equality Act. The SAHRC and the CGE are also authorised in terms of their 
enabling Acts319 to deal with complaints relating to inequality and unfair discrimination. 
These bodies are also recognised as ‘alternative forums’ under the Equality Act.  
 
Both these institutions have made a commendable effort to carry out their duties and uphold 
the Equality Act. The CGE reports that during 2018, 891 cases were opened and almost 83% 
of these cases were closed.320 Similarly, the SAHRC achieved 21 out of 28 of its annual 
targets for 2017/2018. Despite these successes, there still exists room for improvement. ‘If 
the Equality Act is to have a meaningful impact in our society, its goals [must] be pursued 
proactively, both inside and outside the courts’.321  
 
Bodies such as the SAHRC and the CGE should, beyond their roles in adjudicating matters, 
raise awareness regarding equality issues and conduct educational programmes aimed at 
eradicating inequality and unfair discrimination. Going back to the objectives of the Equality 
Act, in changing the views of society, litigation-driven change is insufficient and these 
Chapter 9 Institutions should be more active in driving change at a social level.   
                                                            
316 Regulation 7. 
317 Section 23(2).  
318 Section 23(4).  
319 The Human Rights Act 54 of 1994 and the Commission on Gender Equality Act 39 of 1996. 
320 This can be compared to the 715 cases which were opened in the previous year. Centre for Gender Equality 
‘Annual report 2017/208’. Available at http://www.cge.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/CGE-Annual-
Report-2018-Final-web.pdf, accessed on 28 June 2019.  
321 R Kruger Racism and law: Implementing the right to equality in selected South African equality courts 




4.9 Conclusion  
 
The enforcement of the Equality Act exists in the creation and function of the Equality 
Courts. Change driven by litigation is only possible if complaints are received by the courts 
and if the courts which are to process the complaints function effectively. It seems that since 
the inception of the Act, a number of developments have occurred in relation to the Equality 
Courts including the establishment of the courts at the Magistrates’ Courts level, training of 
the personnel, and an increase of cases which the courts and the Chapter Nine institutions 
hear. The Equality Courts deviate from traditional litigation processes by including a 
direction hearing before trial, allowing an extended list of representatives, and by reducing 
fees payable by the complainant. Given the importance of their roles against the backdrop of 





CHAPTER FIVE: THE SECTION 21(2) REMEDIES  
 
‘Law without remedies is like a broken pencil. Pointless.’ – Michael Bishop 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
As we have already seen, section 21 of the Equality Act makes provision for a wide range of 
remedies. Despite making provision for such a wide range of remedies, a careful examination 
of the Equality Court’s existing case law shows that the most common remedies granted by 
the Court are interdicts, damages and unconditional apologies.322 The purpose of this chapter 
is to set out and discuss the manner in which the courts have interpreted and applied these 
three remedies. Before turning to do so, however, it will be helpful to locate this analyses in a 
discussion of the types of remedies recognised in the South African legal system and the 
manner in which remedies can be classified. 
 




As mentioned above, before turning to set out and discuss the manner in which the courts 
have interpreted and applied section 21 of the Equality Act, it will be helpful to briefly 
discuss the types of remedies recognised in the South African legal system. This discussion is 
limited to criminal sanctions, delictual remedies and constitutional measures. This is because 
the remedies set out in section 21(2) of the Equality Act are drawn largely from these three 
branches of the law.323 
 




                                                            
322 This is discussed later in this Chapter. 
323 In terms of section 21(2)(n) and Equality Court may refer a matter to the Director of Public Prosecutions in 
order to initiate criminal proceedings. It can thus be argued that criminal sanctions also form part of the section 
21 remedies but an Equality Court will not have discretion to impose a criminal sanction. 
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After an accused person has been convicted of a crime, he or she must be sentenced. A 
sentence includes any measure which is applied by the court and finalises a criminal 
matter.324 A punishment, however, is an unpleasant experience imposed by the court after 
conviction.325 Some sentences do not constitute punishment, but most forms of punishment 
will be sentences.326 Terblanche highlights that irrespective of the terminology, all sentences 
should take into account the main purposes of criminal sanctions, namely retribution, 
deterrence, prevention and rehabilitation.327 Section 276(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act328 
contains a list of ‘sentences’ which may be imposed by a court. These include imprisonment, 
a fine, correctional supervision and committal to a treatment centre. Each will be discussed in 
turn. 
 
(b) Imprisonment  
 
Imprisonment is the confinement of an offender in a prison for a duration of time as ordered 
by a court.329 Imprisonment is a drastic measure as it takes away a person’s liberty. The 
duration of the term of imprisonment depends on various factors such as statutory guidelines 
and the jurisdictional limits of a court. Section 284 of the Criminal Procedure Act stipulates 
that no sentence of imprisonment should be less than four days.330  
 
Although courts are constantly urged by society to impose imprisonment liberally, 
Terblanche argues that imprisonment is not as successful in curbing crime as believed by its 
supporters.331 It is submitted that imprisonment is merely a temporary measure as most 
prisoners will be released after serving for the stipulated time. This stance is supported in S v 
D332 where the court pointed out: 
 
                                                            
324 SS Terblanche ‘The sentence’ in JJ Joubert (ed) Criminal Procedure Handbook (2017) 374. 
325 Ibid.  
326 An example of a sentence that does not constitute punishment would be detainment of the convicted person 
until the rising of the court (see SS Terblanche ‘The sentence’ in JJ Joubert (ed) Criminal Procedure Handbook 
(2017) 375).  
327 Ibid. See also G Kemp et al Criminal Law in South Africa 3ed (2018) 25-27. 
328 51 of 1977. 
329 SS Terblanche A Guide to Sentencing in South Africa 3ed (2016) 245. 
330 Unless the sentence is for imprisonment until the rising of the court.  
331 SS Terblanche ‘The sentence’ in JJ Joubert (ed) Criminal Procedure Handbook (2017) 390. 
332 1995 (1) SACR 259 (A) at 264d-e.  
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‘Even if imprisonment has no permanent detrimental effect on a prisoner, it means loss of employment, 
temporary, if not permanent, loss of wife and family, the risk of contamination and impaired ability to get 
further employment.’ 
 
The many disadvantages weighed against the possible advantages of imprisonment illustrate 
that although somewhat effective, the courts are correct to take a precautionary stance when 
imposing a sentence of imprisonment. Given the four-fold focus of criminal sanctions and the 
overall focus of an egalitarian democracy, intermediate measures should always be sought 
before implementing more severe ones. This attitude is also reflected in many statutes which 
not only stipulate the maximum sentence term for imprisonment, but offer the payment of a 
fine as an alternate measure. 
 
(c) A fine 
 
A fine is the most common sentence imposed by the criminal courts and involves ordering an 
offender to pay an amount of money to the State as a punishment for the crime committed.333 
Most statutes include a penalty clause to assist courts in deciding on the amount to impose, 
but fines can also be imposed for any common law crime. Some courts are bound by 
jurisdictional limits. A district magistrates court can impose a fine below R200 000, whilst a 
regional magistrates court can impose a fine between R200 000 and R400 000.334  
 
When exercising their discretion in relation to the imposition of fines, courts will take into 
account the nature and severity of the crime as well as the financial means and access thereto 
of the offender.335 The main purpose of the fine is to punish the offender by creating a 
financial difficulty which worsens the quality of life for the offender. Another purpose is to 
accommodate situations where the imposition of imprisonment is regarded by a court as ‘too 
severe’.336 However, this is countered by the fact that non-payment of the fine results in 
imprisonment.337  
 
                                                            
333 SS Terblanche ‘The sentence’ in JJ Joubert (ed) Criminal Procedure Handbook (2017) 391. 
334 In line with the current jurisdictional limits for these courts.  
335 SS Terblanche ‘The sentence’ in JJ Joubert (ed) Criminal Procedure Handbook (2017) 391. 
336 The purpose would therefore be to keep the offender out of prison. See also SS Terblanche A Guide to 
Sentencing in South Africa 3ed (2016) 297. 
337 The position is explained in S v Van Rooyen 1994 (2) SACR 823 (A). The Van Rooyen decision was 
criticised in S v Seola 1996 (2) SACR 616 (O) at 622c-d. 
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A large portion of the South African population is indigent and this threatens the efficacy of 
the fines system. Given the time delays and expense that can be incurred during a proper 
assessment of the financial position of the accused, presiding officers tend to implement a 
point-of-departure fine without taking into account the means of the offender. Terblanche 
suggests that the point-of-departure system should not be implemented to assess the actual 
amount but rather the extent of the punishment.338  
 
(d) Correctional supervision  
 
Correctional supervision is a sentence which is served by the offender within the community 
and under the control and supervision of correctional officials, subject to conditions which 
have been set by the court or the Commissioner of Correctional Services.339 The imposition 
of correctional supervision usually takes the form of house arrest, monitoring or community 
service.340 It is regarded as a high penal measure as it restricts the freedom of the offender, 
however, the court does have the discretion to lessen the restriction of the sentence. The 
purpose of correctional supervision is to provide a mediatory step that will contribute to the 
reintegration of offenders as law abiding citizens into communities by ensuring that they are 
rehabilitated, monitored and accepted by communities.341  
 
Correctional supervision was introduced in South Africa in 1991 by the Correctional Services 
and Supervision Matters Amendment Act.342 It received high praise as a form of punishment 
as it does not remove the offender from the community wherein he lives and works 
(countering the disadvantage of imprisonment) but still limits the freedom of the offender 
whilst directing him/her into activities that will better improve his or her contribution to 
society.343 In the case of S v Omar,344 the court described correctional supervision as an 
                                                            
338 For example, an offender who has 10 times the means of another deserves 10 times the punishment. This is 
the approach in Germany (see SS Terblanche ‘Die Boete as straf in die Duitse reg’ (2008) 19 Stell LR 347-373). 
339 Department of correctional services ‘Correctional supervision’. Available at 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/?page_id=317, accessed on 02 October 2019. 
340 See SS Terblanche ‘The sentence’ in JJ Joubert (ed) Criminal Procedure Handbook (2017) 397 for a more 
detailed discussion. 
341 Department of Correctional Sservices ‘Correctional supervision’. Available at 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/?page_id=317, accessed on 02 October 2019. 
342122 of 1991.  
343 SS Terblanche A Guide to Sentencing in South Africa 3ed (2016) 317. 
344 1993 (2) SACR 5 (C) at 13d.  
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‘excellent and acceptable alternative… to imprisonment’ which has ‘regard to the present-day 
emphasis on the rehabilitation and reformation of offenders’. 
 
Although correctional supervision can be used in conjunction with any other form of 
punishment, the rehabilitative value of the measure alone is impressive. It is submitted that 
given the egalitarian values of South Africa’s democracy, correctional supervision is a 
remarkable measure which balances the need for punishment and the interests of the 
offending person whilst still serving the greater community. 
 
(e) Committal to a treatment centre  
 
Section 296 of the Criminal Procedure Act allows for the committal of an offender to a 
treatment centre in addition to or in place of any other sentence. The provision applies to 
persons who fall within section 21(1)345 of the old Prevention of and Treatment for Substance 
Abuse Act.346 Although this Act no longer exists, the validity of the provision remains and 
the meaning can still be ascertained.347 The purpose of this provision is to provide 
rehabilitation to offenders for personal shortfalls (such as drug addiction or alcohol 
dependency) insofar as it threatens the welfare of said person or their family.  
 
The nature of this measure is akin to that of imprisonment as the offender loses his/her liberty 
for a period of time. Despite the criticisms of this measure,348 it is submitted that this sanction 
has an important role to play. In the case of S v Harman,349 the court highlighted that this 
measure is less of a sentence and more of a court order which has substantial benefit for the 
offender. It is important to note that committal also serves a higher public interest. A recent 
                                                            
345 Section 21(1) states: ‘Whenever there is lodged with or made before a public prosecutor a sworn declaration 
in writing by any person, including any social worker, alleging that any other person who is within the area of 
jurisdiction of the magistrate’s court to which such prosecutor is attached, is a person who is dependent on drugs 
and in consequence thereof squanders his means or injures his health or endangers the peace or in any other 
manner does harm to his own welfare or the welfare of his family or fails to provide for his own support or for 
that of any dependant whom he is legally liable to maintain, the clerk of the court shall, at the request of the 
public prosecutor, issue and deliver to a police officer a summons to be served on such person calling on him to 
appear before a magistrate within such area at a time and place stated therein, or if the public prosecutor does 
not request the issue of such a summons, a magistrate of the court in question may, on the application of the 
public prosecutor, issue a warrant directing that such person be arrested and as soon thereafter as practicable be 
brought before a magistrate within such area.’ 
346 20 of 1992. 
347 See SS Terblanche ‘The sentence’ in JJ Joubert (ed) Criminal Procedure Handbook (2017). 
348 See SS Terblanche A Guide to Sentencing in South Africa 3ed (2016) 209-218. 
349 1991 (1) SACR 326 (C) at 327i. 
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study published in the South African Medical Journal reported that one out of every five 
adults in South Africa abuses substances.350 A further study by the South African Police 
Services reveals a 10.5% increase in drug-related crimes between 2017 and 2018.351 
Rehabilitation is thus a fundamental step to combat crime and serve the objectives of the 
Constitution.  
 
(f) Mitigating and aggravating factors 
 
Many factors play a role before, during and after the commission of a crime which may 
influence the sentence and punishment. A court has the power to exercise its discretion and 
take into account a variety of factors when identifying aggravating and mitigating factors. 
These would usually depend on the circumstances of each case. Premeditation, lack of 
remorse and the seriousness of the crime all operate as aggravating factors.352 Importantly, 
racism and hate crime also act as important aggravating factors. In S v Van Wyk,353 the court 
rejected the argument that the offender was brought up in a racist environment and stated: 
 
‘there comes a time in the life of a nation when it must… identify such practices as pathologies and seek 
consciously, visibly and irreversibly to reject its shameful past.’ 
 
Mitigating factors include characteristics such as youth, ill health, remorse and the absence of 
previous offenses. Although the factors should be balanced, it is often found that aggravating 
factors outweigh the mitigating factors.354  
 




                                                            
350 L Ramphele ‘There are 10 million South Africans abusing substances’ (17 August 2018). Available at 
http://www.capetalk.co.za/articles/315840/there-are-10-million-south-africans-abusing-substances, accessed on 
18 July 2019. 
351 SAPS ‘Crime stats 2017/2018’. Available at https://www.saps.gov.za/services/crimestats.php, accessed on 18 
July 2019.  
352 SS Terblanche A Guide to Sentencing in South Africa 3ed (2016) 209-218. 
353 1992 (1) SACR 147 (NmS) at 173c. 
354 SS Terblanche A Guide to Sentencing in South Africa 3ed (2016) 210. 
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Delictual remedies operate differently to criminal sanctions. The general purpose of delictual 
remedies is either to compensate the victim for the loss suffered or to prevent harm or further 
harm from occurring. Although the Constitution can be used to develop new remedies, the 
normal remedies available to a victim include an interdict, damages and a retraction and 
apology. Each will be discussed in turn.  
 
(b) Interdict  
 
An interdict is an order of court which can take one of two forms, namely a prohibitory 
interdict and a mandatory interdict.355 A prohibitory interdict restrains a person from 
continuing a wrongful act or committing a threatened wrongful act.356 A mandatory interdict, 
on the other hand, requires positive conduct on the part of the wrongdoer to cease the 
continuation of the wrongful act.  
 
In order to obtain an interdict, the victim must prove:  
• a clear right; 
• an actual or threatened infringement of the right; and 
• the absence of another suitable remedy.357 
 
Even if all the requisites are met, a court still has the discretion to not grant the interdict. In 
general, an interdict will not be granted in instances where the harm is minimal, it is capable 
of being reduced to a monetary value for which an award of damages would suffice, and/or if 
the granting of the interdict would be oppressive to the respondent.358 
 
It is submitted that an interdict is a necessary and succinct remedy that serves an important 
function. It allows for immediate relief without requiring extensive resources359 and does not 
place an excessive burden on the wrongdoer (when exercised correctly). It is, however, 
necessary to highlight that the interdict strays from the typical compensatory nature of 
delictual remedies and only provides relief in the form of averting the wrongful (or 
impending wrongful) act.  
                                                            
355 J Neethling and JM Potgieter Law of Delict 7ed (2015) 269. 
356 JC van der Walt and JR Midgley Principles of Delict 3ed (2005) 212. 
357 M Loubser et al The Law of Delict in South Africa 3ed (2017) 525.  
358 JC van der Walt and JR Midgley Principles of Delict 3ed (2005) 212. See RM v RB 2015 (1) SA 270 (KZP).  






A person who has been harmed as a result of the unlawful conduct of another person can 
claim delictual damages in the form of compensation from the wrongdoer. Delictual damages 
may be claimed from the wrongdoer in terms of either the actio legis aquilia or the actio 
iniuriarum. Damages can be claimed in terms of the actio legis acquilia when the harm takes 
the form of patrimonial loss and in terms of the actio iniuriarum when the harm takes the 
form of an infringement of the victim’s personality rights.360  
 
It is important to distinguish delictual damages from constitutional damages because they 
have different goals. In the case of Dendy v University of the Witwatersrand,361 the court held 
that delictual damages are aimed at compensating a person for the harm or loss he or she has 
suffered as a result of the wrongdoer’s unlawful conduct, while constitutional damages are 
aimed at vindicating the rights guaranteed in the Constitution and at preventing further future 
infringements.362  
 
Damages themselves can be divided into two categories, namely special damages and general 
damages. Special damages refer to those damages that are specified and proven by a victim. 
It is the amount awarded for quantifiable loss. General damages, on the other hand, are 
awarded by a court in estimation of the total value of loss, which includes both patrimonial 
and non-patrimonial loss as well as the cost of the probable consequences that can materialise 
from the actions of the wrongdoer. The assessment of general damages lies in the discretion 
of the court.363  
 
Calculating damages involves a two-step process: First, the court must identify and establish 
the nature and extent of the harm that has been suffered; and, second, the court must quantify 
the harm. 
 
                                                            
360 See Kumalo v Cycle Lab (Pty) Ltd (31871/2008) [2011] ZAGPJHC 56. The thesis singles out the actio 
iniuriarum, rather than the Aquillian action, due to its nature which closely relates to the underlying purpose of 
The Equality Act which also seeks to protect a person’s dignity to the extent that it can be impaired by hate 
speech, unfair discrimination and harassment.  
361 2005 (5) SA 357 (W). 
362 Para 20.  
363 M Loubser et al The Law of Delict in South Africa 3ed (2017) 487. 
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The quantification of non-patrimonial loss is a speculative process as courts have no precise 
guidelines to assist them in tallying the final amount.364 Depending on the circumstances of a 
case, the court can assess factors such as the age and lifestyle of the victim, the extent and 
duration of the harm and any other relevant factor as considered in previous cases.365 Loubser 
et al. highlight that in awarding damages for non-patrimonial loss, the courts take a 
conservative approach.366 
 
It is submitted that a remedy of damages serves the primary purpose of a delictual action, 
namely to compensate a victim for the harm suffered. The assessment of damages is a rather 
involved process which requires active participation and the exercise of discretion from the 
courts in order to ensure that the final award of damages is fair to both sides. The courts, 
however, seem to be failing in exercising their discretion by taking a more conservative 
approach to non-patrimonial damages. Given the extensive case law available, it is submitted 
that clearer guidelines should be developed as actions for non-patrimonial loss are not new to 
South African law.  
 
(d) Retraction and apology 
 
Under the law of delict, a retraction of the offending words or conduct coupled with an 
apology operates as a mitigating factor to reduce the award of damages.  A retraction 
signifies that the defendant revokes the offending statement whereas an apology operates as 
an instance of remorse for having committed the wrong.367 Although the two can operate as 
mutually exclusive, a retraction and apology is usually sought together.368  
 
                                                            
364 Ibid 515. 
365 See JC van der Walt and JR Midgley Principles of Delict 3ed (2005) 228. 
366 M Loubser et al The Law of Delict in South Africa 3 ed (2017) 517. See also De Jongh v Du Pisanie NO 
[2004] 2 All SA 565 (SCA) at para 60-61 and Protea Assurance Co Ltd v Lamb 1971 (1) SA 530 (A) at para 
535-536. 
367 See W Vandenbussch ‘Rethinking non-pecuniary remedies for defamation: The case for court-ordered 
apologies’ (31 August 2018). Available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3236766, 
accessed on 04 October 2019.  
368 A more detailed discussion of retraction is not necessary for the purpose of this thesis and therefore will not 
be assessed in greater depth. For more information on retractions see M Loubser et al The Law of Delict in South 
Africa 3ed (2017) and W Vandenbussch ‘Rethinking non-pecuniary remedies for defamation: The case for 
court-ordered apologies’ (31 August 2018). Available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3236766, accessed on 04 October 2019. 
84 
 
In order for the apology to be accepted, it must comprise of a full and frank withdrawal of the 
offending words or conduct, as well as some expression of regret.369 ‘An apology should be 
fair and full and be given equal publicity; it must be made within a reasonable amount of 
time, be unreserved and must not be withdrawn’.370 A distinction between full and partial 
apologies should be acknowledged. According to theorists, apologies consist of different 
facets: an affirmation or acknowledgment of fault; an expression of regret, remorse or 
sorrow; a willingness to repair and a promise to adapt future behaviour.371 Whereas partial 
apologies would consist of few, but not all of these elements, full apologies would 
incorporate all or the majority of them.372 
 
Apology as a remedy was previously believed to be abrogated by disuse, but since 2002 the 
remedy has reappeared – although courts are reluctant to accept it to its full extent.373 It is 
submitted that apology as a remedy has a valuable role to play in upholding Ubuntu and thus 
should be given greater attention in order to develop it as a remedy rather than merely a 
mitigating factor.374  
 
An apology is often regarded as being an effective mechanism to reconcile the parties and 
avoid further harm by requiring some form of remorse and reform on the part of the 
wrongdoer. Although an apology may be insufficient in certain instances,375 it is submitted 
that apologies in our law still serve an important purpose. Apologies serve as a critically 
                                                            
369 JC van der Walt and JR Midgley Principles of Delict 3ed (2005) 216. 
370 Ibid.  
371 W Vandenbussch ‘Introducing Apology Legislation in Civil Law Systems. A New Way to Encourage Out-
of-Court Dispute Resolution’ (23 August 2018). Available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3237528, accessed on 04 October 2019. 
372 Ibid.  
373 See Mineworkers Investment Co (Pty) Ltd v Modibane 2002 (6) SA 512 (W), Young v Shaikh 2004 (3) SA 46 
(C) and Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 (6) SA 235 (CC). See also D Milo ‘It’s hard for me to say I’m sorry: Apology 
as a Remedy in the South African Law of Defamation’ (2012) Journal of Media Law 11-16. 
374 In line with sections 173 and 39(2) of the Constitution. In the case of Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 (6) SA 235 
(CC), Justice Mokgoro held that ‘the focus on monetary compensation diverts attention from two considerations 
that should be basic to defamation law. The first is that the reparation sought is essentially for injury to one's 
honour, dignity and reputation, and not to one's pocket. The second is that courts should attempt, wherever 
feasible, to re-establish a dignified and respectful relationship between the parties. Because an apology serves to 
recognize the human dignity of the plaintiff, thus acknowledging, in the true sense of Ubuntu, his or her inner 
humanity, the resultant harmony would serve the good of both the plaintiff and the defendant’ (at para 69).  
375 See Young v Shaikh 2004 (3) SA 46 (C). It is argued that widespread harm caused by publication to a great 
number of recipients substantially outweighs the restorative value of retraction and apologies (see W 
Vandenbussch ‘Rethinking non-pecuniary remedies for defamation: The case for court-ordered apologies’ (31 
August 2018). Available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3236766, accessed on 04 
October 2019.  
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significant behavioural determinant and a means to rebuild social harmony in the 
community.376  
 
On this note, the court in the case of Le Roux v Dey377 highlighted the purpose of the apology:  
 
‘Respect for the dignity of others lies at the heart of the Constitution and the society we aspire to. That respect 
breeds tolerance for one another in the diverse society we live in. Without that respect for each other’s dignity 
our aim to create a better society may come to naught. It is the foundation of our young democracy. And 
reconciliation between people who opposed each other in the past is something which was, and remains, central 
and crucial to our constitutional endeavour. Part of reconciliation, at all different levels, consists of recantation 
of past wrongs and apology for them. That experience has become part of the fabric of our society. The law 
cannot enforce reconciliation but it should create the best conditions for making it possible. We can see no 
reason why the creation of those conditions should not extend to personal relationships where the actionable 
dignity of one has been impaired by another.’378 
 
The above view was supported by Mokgoro J and Sachs J who argued that given their wide 
discretion in granting remedies, courts should be pro-active in encouraging apology and 
mutual understanding wherever possible.379 
 
5.2.4 Constitutional measures 
 
The Constitution introduced an entrenched and extensive Bill of Rights. In Fose v Minister of 
Safety and Security,380 the Constitutional Court encouraged the courts to be innovative in 
developing remedial tools for the effective assertion of constitutional rights. A remedial tool 
is a mechanism which is employed by a court to repair an infringement of rights suffered by a 
victim.381   
 
                                                            
376 W Vandenbussch ‘Rethinking non-pecuniary remedies for defamation: The case for court-ordered apologies’ 
(31 August 2018). Available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3236766, accessed on 04 
October 2019.  
377 2011 (3) SA 274 (CC). 
378 Le Roux v Dey 2011 (3) SA 274 (CC) at para 202. 
379 See Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 (6) SA 235 (CC) at paras 68- 69. 
380 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC) at para 69.   
381 P de Vos and W Freedman South African Constitutional Law in Context (2014) 390. 
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The types of remedies which may be granted by a court are governed by the Constitution. 
Sections 8(2),382 8(3)383 and 39(2)384 of the Constitution all encourage the courts to develop 
and use the common law when granting remedies, taking into account the nature and extent 
of the right. Courts are thus granted broad remedial discretion in deciding on a just and 
equitable order.385 The wide discretion granted to the courts was emphasises by the 
Constitutional Court Fose v Minister of Safety and Security when it stated that: 
 
‘in exercising our discretion to choose between appropriate forms of relief, we must carefully analyse the nature 
of the constitutional infringement and strike effectively at its source’.386 
 
Sections 38387 and 172(1)388 of the Constitution further provide the courts with the power to 
develop and grant other forms of ‘appropriate relief’. It is thus submitted that courts are given 
a wide discretion when granting remedies. To ensure that a remedy amounts to being 
‘appropriate relief’, the courts are required to conduct a balancing process guided by the 
following four objectives:  
• to remedy the wrong;  
• to deter future violations;  
                                                            
382 Section 8(2) provides: A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to the 
extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the 
right. 
383 Section 8(3) provides: When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic person in terms 
of subsection (2), a court: 
(a) in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or if necessary develop, the common law to the 
extent that legislation does not give effect to that right; and 
(b) may develop rules of the common law to limit the right, provided that the limitation is in accordance 
with section 36 (1). 
384 When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law, every court, 
tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. 
385 See Janse van Rensburg NO v Minister of Trade and Industry NO 2001 (1) SA 29 (CC) at para 28. 
386 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) at para #.   
387 Section 38 provides: ‘Anyone listed in this section has the right to approach a competent court, alleging that 
a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened, and the court may grant appropriate relief, 
including a declaration of rights. The persons who may approach a court are: 
(a) anyone acting in their own interest; 
(b) anyone acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in their own name; 
(c) anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of persons; 
(d) anyone acting in the public interest; and 
(e) an association acting in the interest of its members’. 
388 Section 172(1) provides: ‘When deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a court: 
(a) must declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid to the extent of its 
inconsistency; and 
(b) may make any order that is just and equitable, including: 
(i) an order limiting the retrospective effect of the declaration of invalidity; and 
(ii)an order suspending the declaration of invalidity for any period and on any conditions, to allow the 
competent authority to correct the defect’. 
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• to make an order that can be complied with (i.e. does not overburden the wrongdoer); 
and  
• to make an order that is fair to those who may be affected by the relief.389 
 
Although the courts frequently rely on common law remedies, they have also used the wide 
discretion conferred upon them by the Constitution to develop unique constitutional 
remedies.390 Among these are the following:  
• Interdicts: As mentioned before, interdicts either compel or prohibit certain 
behaviours from a defendant. Structural interdicts are an additional mechanism 
developed by the Constitutional Court to supervise governmental steps taken to 
comply with the Constitution.391 
 
• Constitutional damages:  Damages can either be paid to compensate a person for harm 
which was caused by another or to mitigate future loss from the action of the other 
person. The probability of a successful award for constitutional damages is relatively 
slim.392 However, the need for this remedy still exists as it is appropriate in cases 
where no other form of relief would achieve the goal of vindicating the right and it 
may be necessary to encourage victims to report on human rights violations.393  
 
• Meaningful engagement: This remedy involves a dialogue between the parties to a 
dispute in order to identify and achieve certain objectives. It operates almost like a 
negotiation in order to identify the most appropriate course of action to satisfy both 
parties to the dispute. It is submitted that this remedy is a progressive one as it 
promotes participatory democracy, transparency and accountability.394 
 
Constitutional law remedies thus aim at protecting the rights of individuals and seek to 
achieve the vindication of fundamental rights in order to promote the values of an open and 
                                                            
389 Hoffman v South African Airways 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC) at para 45. See also C Okpaluba ‘Developing the 
Jurisprudence of Constitutional Remedies for Breach of Fundamental Rights in South Africa: An Analysis of 
Hoffman and Related Cases’ (2017) 32(1) Southern African Public Law 1-26. 
390 K Hofmeyr ‘A Central-Case Analysis of Constitutional Remedial Power’ (2008) 125(3) SALJ 525. 
391 K Roach ‘Crafting remedies for violations of economic, social and cultural rights’ in J Squires et al The road 
to a remedy: Current issues in the litigation of economic, social and cultural rights (2005) 113. 
392 See City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd and Another 
(CC) 2012 (2) SA 104 (CC) and Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC).  
393 P de Vos and W Freedman South African Constitutional Law in Context (2014) 412. 
394 Ibid.  
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democratic society based on freedom and equality and respect for human rights.395 Given the 
entrenched importance granted to the rights listed in the Bill of Rights, constitutional 
remedies also seek to punish those who have infringed fundamental rights in a particularly 
gross fashion whilst simultaneously preventing any future infringements of rights.396 The 
Constitutional Courts further acknowledge that at the heart of a dispute lies the harm caused 
to a plaintiff and thus remedies have been developed to address the harm caused to the 
plaintiff as a consequence of an infringement of rights.397 
 
5.3 The classification of remedies  
 
5.3.1 Introduction   
 
Jimenez argues that “ostensibly distinct remedies” (e.g. apologies, damages, interdicts) can 
be divided into one or more broad remedial categories. These remedial categories are related 
to one another and are distinguished from each other on the basis of the remedial interests 
they serve, for example restoration, retribution, coercion and protection. 398 
 
The remedial interests served by these categories focus either on the victim (usually the 
plaintiff) or the wrongdoer (usually the defendant) and they do so from an ex ante perspective 
or ex post perspective. An ex ante perspective focusses on remedies issued prior to the 
commission of the wrongful act (e.g. an interdict), while an ex post perspective focusses on 
remedies issued after a wrongful act has been committed (e.g. damages).399 
 
5.3.2 The remedial categories 
 
The four broad remedial categories these remedial interests give rise to are as follows: 
• The first category focuses on the victim from an ex post perspective. These remedies 
are restorative in nature. They are aimed at restoring the victim of wrongful conduct 
                                                            
395 Preamble of the Constitution. 
396 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) at para 17. 
397 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) at para 17. 
398 M Jimenez ‘Remedial consilience’ (2013) 62(5) Emory Law Journal 1309 1312. 
399 M Jimenez ‘Remedial consilience’ (2013) 62(5) Emory Law Journal 1309 1313. 
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to the position he or she occupied before the harm. A common restorative remedy is 
an order of specific performance.400 
 
• The second category focuses on the wrongdoer also from an ex post perspective. 
These remedies are retributive in nature. They are aimed at punishing the wrongdoer 
for the harm he or she has already caused. A common retributive remedy is a fine or 
imprisonment.401 
 
• The third category focuses on the wrongdoer from an ex ante perspective. These 
remedies are coercive in nature. They are aimed at deterring future potential 
wrongdoers from engaging in harmful conduct. A common deterrent remedy is an 
order of contempt of court.402 
 
• The fourth and last category focuses on the victim from an ex ante perspective. These 
remedies are protective in nature. They are aimed at protecting the victim from 
threatened harmful conduct before it actually takes place. A common protective 
remedy is a prohibitory interdict.403 
 
It is interesting to note that the remedial interests reflected in the first (restorative interests) 
and third categories (coercive interests) are at the forefront of the debate between corrective 
justice scholars who argue that remedies ought to provide just compensation to victims of 
wrongful conduct and land and economics scholars who argue that remedies ought to deter 
potential future wrongdoers.404 
 
Similarly, it is also interesting to note the remedial interests reflected in the second category 
(restorative interests) and the third category (coercive interests) are at the forefront of the 
debate between scholars who are argue that the criminal law must serve a retributive purpose 
and those who argue that it must serve a deterrent purpose.405  
 
                                                            
400 Ibid. 
401 M Jimenez ‘Remedial consilience’ (2013) 62(5) Emory Law Journal 1309 1314. 
402 Ibid. 
403 M Jimenez ‘Remedial consilience’ (2013) 62(5) Emory Law Journal 1309 1315. 
404 M Jimenez ‘Remedial consilience’ (2013) 62(5) Emory Law Journal 1309 1316. 
405 M Jimenez ‘Remedial consilience’ (2013) 62(5) Emory Law Journal 1309 1317. 
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5.3.3 Equality Act remedies 
 
The different categories identified by Jimenez provide a useful framework within which 
section 21(2) of the Equality Act may be analysed. In this respect, it is submitted that the 
remedies listed in section 21(2) may be divided among the four categories as follows: 
• First, the remedies listed in paragraph (d),406 paragraph (g),407 paragraph (i)408 and 
paragraph (j)409 are aimed at restoring the victim to the position he or she was in 
before the harmful conduct and may be classified as restorative remedies. 
 
• Second, the remedies listed in paragraph (d),410 paragraph (e),411 paragraph (n)412 and 
paragraph (o)413 are aimed at punishing the wrongdoer for the harm he or she has 
already caused and may be categorised as retributive remedies. 
 
• Third, the remedies listed in paragraph (a),414 paragraph (i), paragraph (k),415 
paragraph (l),416 paragraph (m)417 and paragraph (p)418 are aimed at deterring future 
wrongdoers from engaging in wrongful conduct and may be classified as deterrent 
remedies. 
 
                                                            
406 Paragraph (d) makes provision for ‘an order for the payment of any damages in respect of any proven 
financial loss, including future loss, or in respect of impairment of dignity, pain and suffering or emotional and 
psychological suffering, as a result of the unfair discrimination, hate speech or harassment in question’. 
407 Paragraph (g) makes provision for ‘an order to make specific opportunities and privileges unfairly denied in 
the circumstances, available to the complainant in question’.  
408 Paragraph (i) makes provision for ‘an order directing the reasonable accommodation of a group or class of 
persons by the respondent’. 
409 Paragraph (j) makes provision for ‘an order that an unconditional apology be made’. 
410 Paragraph (d) makes provision for ‘an order for the payment of any damages in respect of any proven 
financial loss, including future loss, or in respect of impairment of dignity, pain and suffering or emotional and 
psychological suffering, as a result of the unfair discrimination, hate speech or harassment in question’. 
411 Paragraph (e) makes provision for ‘after hearing the views of the parties or, in the absence of the respondent, 
the views of the complainant in the matter, an order for the payment of damages in the form of an award to an 
appropriate body or organisation’. 
412 Paragraph (n) makes provision for ‘an order directing the clerk of the equality court to submit the matter to 
the Director of Public Prosecutions having jurisdiction for the possible institution of criminal proceedings in 
terms of the common law or relevant legislation’. 
413 Paragraph (o) makes provision for ‘an appropriate order of costs against any party to the proceedings’. 
414 Paragraph (a) makes provision for ‘an interim order’. 
415 Paragraph (k) makes provision for ‘an order requiring the respondent to undergo an audit of specific policies 
or practices as determined by the court’. 
416 Paragraph (l) makes provision for ‘an appropriate order of a deterrent nature, including the recommendation 
to the appropriate authority, to suspend or revoke the licence of a person’. 
417 Paragraph (m) makes provision for ‘a directive requiring the respondent to make regular progress reports to 
the court or to the relevant constitutional institution regarding the implementation of the court’s order’. 
418 Paragraph (p) makes provision for ‘an order to comply with any provision of the Act’. 
91 
 
• Fourth, the remedies listed in paragraph (b),419 paragraph (f),420 paragraph (h)421 and 
paragraph (i) are aimed at protecting the victim from threatened wrongful conduct and 
may be categorised as protective remedies. 
 
Although the remedies listed in section 21(2) of the Equality Act are spread out among all 
four remedial categories, the majority focus on the wrongdoer rather than the victim and, 
more particularly, focus on the deterring wrongdoers from engaging in wrongful conduct in 
the future. In other words, the majority of section 21(2) remedies focus on the wrongdoer 
from an ex ante perspective. 
 
Despite the fact that section 21(1) appears to favour deterrence over the other remedial 
categories, this category has not featured as prominently in the case law as might have been 
expected. As a careful examination of the Equality Act jurisprudence illustrates, the courts 
have relied heavily on three remedies in particular, namely interdicts, damages and 
unconditional apologies. 
 
Instead of looking forward and focusing on deterring wrongdoers from engaging in wrongful 
conduct in the future, therefore, the courts have predominantly look backwards and focused 
on restoring the victim or punishing the wrongdoer. Given that the majority of cases have 
focused on individualised acts of hate speech rather than systematic patters of unfair 
discrimination, this backward looking focus on individual victims and wrongdoers is not 
surprising.  
 
Having discussed the types of remedies recognised in the South African legal system and the 
manner in which remedies can be classified, we may now turn to set out and discuss the 





                                                            
419 Paragraph (b) makes provision for ‘a declaratory order’. 
420 Paragraph (f) makes provision for ‘an order restraining unfair discriminatory practices or directing that 
specific steps be taken to stop the unfair discrimination, hate speech or harassment’. 
421 Paragraph (h) makes provision for ‘an order for the implementation of special measures to address the unfair 
discrimination, hate speech or harassment in question’. 
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5.4 Interdicts  
 
The power of the Equality Courts to grant interdicts is contained in section 21(2)(f). An 
interdict is a summary remedy ordered by courts when someone needs protection of his or her 
rights against unlawful interference or the threat of unlawful interference. Interdicts can 
operate to stop/prevent a person from acting/taking action (prohibitory), to force a person to 
act/take action (mandatory) or to order a person to return to the applicant that which he/she 
was deprived off (restitutionary). Interdicts are not a new concept in our law and have been 
implemented extensively as delictual and constitutional remedies which enhances our 
understanding of interdicts as they exist under the Equality Act. Although the purpose of the 
interdict under the Equality Act is similar to that of its constitutional counterpart i.e. 
vindication of the fundamental right that was infringed and to deter further infringements of 
that right, the remedies of the Equality Act are standalone and should not be disguised as 
mere constitutional remedies.422  
 
In order to better understand the role of the interdict as a remedy, the case of Afri-Forum and 
Another v Malema and Others423 can be examined. In this case, Afri-Forum approached the 
Equality Court for an order prohibiting Mr Julius Malema (the leader of the African National 
Congress Youth League at the time) from singing a struggle song entitled ‘Awadubula 
ibhulu’424 at public events. When deciding this case, the judge set out the historical context of 
the song, the meaning of the word ‘Boer’, the struggle against the oppressive apartheid 
regime, and South Africa’s journey to a democratic constitutional era.425 Afri-Forum claimed 
that singing the song caused systemic disadvantage for Afrikaners, undermined their dignity 
and propagated hatred and violence against them.426 Malema and the ANC, however, 
defended the song by arguing that it holds a place in South African history as a liberation 
song intended to symbolise the destruction of oppression and the apartheid regime.427 The 
Equality Court rejected this argument and found that the singing of the song by Malema 
                                                            
422 Support for this view can be found in R Kruger Racism and law: Implementing the right to equality in 
selected South African equality courts (Unpublished Thesis, Rhodes University, 2008) 183. 
4232011 (6) SA 240 (EqC).  
424 Which translates to ‘shoot the boer’. 
425 M du Plessis, S Pudifin, and G Penfold ‘Bill of Rights Jurisprudence’ (2011) 1 Annual Survey of South 
African Law 105. 
426 Afri-Forum and Another v Malema and Others 2011 (6) S 240 (EqC) at para 49. 
427 Afri-Forum and Another v Malema and Others 2011 (6) S 240 (EqC) at para 53.  
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constituted hate speech as described in the Equality Act.428 In line with this, the respondents 
were interdicted from singing the song.429 
 
Critics of interdicts as a form of remedy highlight that although interdicts appear effective on 
the surface, one may still continue with the offending conduct in private or in circumstances 
where it is difficult or impossible to anticipate and prevent such conduct.430 In response to 
this criticism the Court in Afri-Forum stated that interdicts encourage people to pursue new 
ideals and find a new morality.431 The Equality Court also highlighted that interdicts, 
especially in the context of equality legislation regulate future conduct and sets the moral 
standard to which members of society must adhere.432 
 
A number of academic authors have criticised the Afri-Forum judgment on the grounds that 
the Equality Court minimised the factual complexity of the case, first, by deciding which 
facts are legally relevant, and, second, by reducing their meaning to a simple judgment of 
legal or illegal.433 It is submitted, however, that the decision is forward-thinking and goal-
centred. The interdict was a necessary step for South Africa’s democracy to flourish and it is 
further suggested that in honouring South African history, it is not necessary to lick old 
wounds.  
 
5.5 Damages  
 
The payment of damages under the Equality Act operates on two levels: monetary 
compensation paid to a person434 and punitive damages payable to a charity.435 This balances 
individual justice with the educative aims of the Act, whilst still serving the wider interests of 
the community. In the case of Donaldo v Haripersa,436 the Equality Court highlighted that the 
                                                            
428 Afri-Forum and Another v Malema and Others 2011 (6) S 240 (EqC) at para 109. 
429 Afri-Forum and Another v Malema and Others 2011 (6) S 240 (EqC) at para 112. The decision was appealed 
to the Supreme Court of Appeal, however, the parties reached a settlement agreement, which was made an order 
of court the following day, substituting the order of the Equality Court. 
430 Afri-Forum and Another v Malema and Others 2011 (6) S 240 (EqC) at paras 109- 110. 
431 Afri-Forum and Another v Malema and Others 2011 (6) S 240 (EqC) at para 110. 
432 Ibid. 
433 See generally N Buitendag and K van Marle ‘Afriforum v Malema: the limits of law and complexity’ (2014) 
17(6) PER 2893-2914. Available at http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1727-
37812014000600021, accessed on 02/08/2019. 
434 Section 21(2)(d). 
435 Section 21(2)(e).  
436 (29/05) [2007] ZAEQC 3.  
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concept of damages is founded in the civil court practice, and thus although Equality Courts 
are quasi-constitutional, they apply the civil standard of adjudication. Visser and Potgieter 
define ‘damages’ as ‘the diminution as a result of a damage-causing event, in the utility or 
quality of a patrimonial or personality interest in satisfying the legally recognised needs of 
the person involved’.437  
 
Payment of damages to a victim are not new in South African law. It serves a similar function 
to damages as included under delictual claims for personality infringements and 
constitutional damages for the vindication of guaranteed rights. Damages that are paid to an 
individual achieves restorative justice whilst acknowledging the victim’s dignity. The 
damages that a complainant may claim under the Equality Act includes past or future 
financial loss and damages for impairment of dignity, pain and suffering or emotional and 
psychological suffering.438 In deciding on the final amount, a court should have regard to the 
circumstances of each case taking into account relevant factors, including the financial 
situation of the respondent.439 An example of this is the decision in Donaldo v Haripersa, 
where the Equality Court had to decide on the amount of damages to award after finding the 
respondent guilty of infringing section 13 of the Equality Act. In this case the Court only 
upheld the complainant's claim for impairment of her dignity and emotional and 
psychological suffering. It refused to take into account medical costs as they were 
unsubstantiated. A final award of R10 000 paid in monthly instalments of R1 000 a month 
was granted. 
 
Section 21(2)(e) of the Equality Act is a new remedy that provides for punitive damages 
which can be paid to a relevant body or organisation. It is submitted that such a remedy is 
commendable as a forward-looking and community-orientated device. The amount that a 
respondent pays has a wider effect in assisting victimised groups and encouraging a more 
tolerant society. It is further submitted that this remedy is especially useful in cases whereby 
the harassment, unfair discrimination and/or hate speech constituted a public attack either by 
victimising a group of people rather than an individual or by publication to a wide audience 
                                                            
437 PJ Visser and JM Potgieter Law of Damages (1993) 22. 
438 R Kruger Racism and law: Implementing the right to equality in selected South African equality courts 
(Unpublished Thesis, Rhodes University, 2008) 187. 
439 Ibid.  
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which could potentially incite further intolerance. In such circumstances, payment of the 
money to a relevant organisation can be used to further the interests of the victimised groups.  
 
An example of the application of section 21(2)(e) of the Act, can be found in the case of 
Sonke Gender Justice Network v Malema.440 In this case the respondent (Mr Malema) was 
accused of violating the provisions of the Equality Act while addressing members of the 
public at a technikon in Cape Town. The offending words were:  
 
‘When a woman didn't enjoy it, she leaves early in the morning. Those who had a nice time will wait until the 
sun comes out, requests breakfast and taxi money. In the morning that lady requested breakfast and taxi money. 
You don't ask for taxi money from somebody who raped you.’441 
 
The Equality Court in this case found the utterances by Mr Malema amounted to both hate 
speech and harassment and ordered him to pay R50 000 to People Opposed to Women 
Abuse, as sought by the complainants. It is submitted that although the decision itself cannot 
be faulted, the Court in this case failed in carrying out its objectives as it did not apply its 
mind to determining the quantum of damages. Merely rubber-stamping the plea of the 
complainant was a languid act on the part of the Court which defeated its very purpose.  
 
The approach adopted in Sonke Gender Justice Network can be compared with the approach 
adopted in African National Congress v Sparrow,442 which concerned a Facebook entry 
posted by Ms Penny Sparrow which was deemed to amount to hate speech. The offending 
post read:  
 
‘These monkeys that are allowed to be released on New Year’s Eve and onto public beaches, towns, etcetera, 
absolutely have no education whatsoever. So to allow them loose is inviting huge dirt and troubles and 
discomfort to others. I am sorry to say that I was among the revellers and all I saw was black on black skins. 
What a shame. I do know some wonderful thoughtful black people. This lot of monkeys just don’t want to even 
try but think they can voice opinions about statute and their way. Dear, oh, dear, from now on I shall address the 
blacks of South Africa as monkeys as I see the cute little wild monkeys do the same, pick, drop and litter.’443 
 
                                                            
440 2010 (7) BCLR 729 (EqC).  
441 Sonke Gender Justice Network v Malema 2010 (7) BCLR 729 (EqC) at para 2. 
442 (01/16) [2016] ZAEQC 1. 
443 African National Congress v Sparrow (01/16) [2016] ZAEQC 1 at para 33.  
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The remarks made by Ms Sparrow was not targeted at an individual but rather victimised an 
entire group, namely black people. When deciding the case, the Equality Court had regard to 
previous decisions of hate speech as well as the history of racism directed towards black 
people. The Court granted an award of damages in the sum of R150 000 payable to the Oliver 
and Adelaide Tambo Foundation which promotes non-racialism and tolerance, reconciliation 
and social economic upliftment in South Africa.444 In arriving at this amount the Court noted 
that although it is difficult to assess the monetary value of injured feelings, awards should 
generally be restrained but serve as a deterrent. Unfortunately, no further indication was 
given as to the manner in which the Court arrived at the final amount nor the factors 
considered when deciding on the recipient organisation. The Court’s failure to indicate which 
factors it took into account was criticised in South African Human Rights Commission v 
Khumalo,445 which described the judgment as ‘crude and underserving of endorsement’446. 
 
It is submitted that damages as a remedy has an important role to play in promoting the 
objectives of the Equality Act. Whilst both sections 21(2)(d) and (e) have illustrated a clear 
role to play, the courts’ generally uninspired approach needs to be revised. Equality Courts 
were granted extensive discretion in awarding damages and should be more active in doing 
so. A commendable effort can be seen in South African Human Rights Commission v 
Qwelane,447 where the Equality Court, upon finding a cartoon to amount to hate speech, 
ordered an amount of Rl00 000 be paid as damages to promote and raise awareness of the 
LGBTQIAP+ community. This decision is applauded as the Court awarded the damages to 
the SAHRC. Given the role of the Chapter Nine Institutions, it is submitted that courts should 
award damages to these Institutions and direct them to use the money to further the specific 
interests of the groups affected. It is further submitted that clearer guidelines and more 
consistent factors need to be employed when calculating an award of damages as the current 
approach can be criticised as being a ‘thumb-suck’448 intended to merely soothe society’s 




                                                            
444 53. 
445 [2019] 1 All SA 254 (GJ). 
446 South African Human Rights Commission v Khumalo [2019] 1 All SA 254 (GJ) at para 111. 
447 (44/EQJHB) [2011] ZAEQC 3.  
448 2019 (1) SA 289 (GJ).  
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5.6 Unconditional apologies  
 
Section 21(2)(j) of the Equality Act provides for an ‘unconditional apology’. Where a 
person’s dignity and bodily integrity is impaired, a difficulty arises in trying to restore what 
has been lost. Despite this difficulty the law seeks to restore it as far as possible by 
developing the device of ‘an apology’.449 An unconditional apology under the Equality Act 
requires: 
• a declaration from the respondent acknowledging that she/he had infringed the dignity 
of the complainant by discriminating against her/him unfairly, publishing or 
disseminating information that could reasonably be regarded as discriminating 
unfairly, subjecting her/him to hate speech and/or harassing her/him; and  
• a sincere apology from the conduct.450  
 
The view taken in developing the remedy is that an award of damages is insufficient to 
assuage iniuriae, however, the remedy can be used in conjunction with any other appropriate 
remedy.451  
 
An unconditional apology shifts the focus from a punishment for unfair discrimination, hate 
speech or harassment to an operational tool to promote equality both at an individual and a 
societal level. The role that an apology plays for a society was highlighted in the case of 
South African Human Rights Commission v Khumalo.452 In this case a complaint was laid 
after the respondent violated the provisions of the Equality Act by publishing the following 
offending comments on social media on the 7th of January 2016:  
 
‘cleanse South Africa of all whites. We must act as Hitler did to the Jews. I don’t believe any more that the is a 
large number of not so racist whit people. I’m starting to be sceptical even of those within our Movement ANC. 
I will from today unfriend all white people I have as friends from today u must be put under the same blanket as 
any other racist white because secretly u (sic) all are a bunch of racist fuck heads. as we already seen.’453 
 
                                                            
449 See generally Naylor v Central News Agency 1910 WLD 189 for more information about the initial 
emergence of this device. 
450 R Kruger Racism and law: Implementing the right to equality in selected South African equality courts 
(Unpublished Thesis, Rhodes University, 2008) 191. 
451 JR Midgley ‘Retraction, Apology and Right to Reply’ (1995) 58 THRHR 289. 
452 2019 (1) SA 289 (GJ).  
453 South African Human Rights Commission v Khumalo 2019 (1) SA 289 (GJ) at para 10.  
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On the 8th of January the respondent apologised for the above comments by saying: 
 
‘I would like to aplogiese (sic) to the Gauteng Government for my emotional comments that I made on a public 
platform. I further want to apologise to the ANC for the comments I made that do not reflect the ideologies of a 
Democratic society that are out ideals.’454 
 
 In deciding the matter, the High Court criticised the apology made by the respondent as 
being ‘hollow’ due to his subsequent actions.455 The respondent argued that the utterances did 
not amount to hate speech yet provided what would otherwise be a sufficient apology. The 
actions of the respondent amounted to a tacit withdrawal of the apology and the court 
suggested that his apology was not for the wrongdoing but rather the publicity and 
consequences which is attracted.456 Given that the aim of the Equality Act is to identify and 
eradicate unfair discrimination, hate speech and harassment, it is necessary that a person who 
commits such an act admits and appreciates the error of her or his actions before issuing the 
‘unconditional apology’. 
 
Unconditional apologies under the Equality Act are forward-looking and aim at the 
restoration of relations between the complainant and respondent. It is submitted that 
apologies are an important cog in South Africa’s democracy as the narrow the social divide 
by encouraging tolerance and understanding. Apologies also require a more active role by the 
respondent which is unique when compared with other remedies where the courts make the 
biggest decisions.  
 
It is important to note that the application of an apology under the Equality Act operates 
differently to that under the law of delict. Whilst an apology in delict is viewed as a mere 
mitigating factor, the Equality Act views an apology as a full and appropriate remedy. This 
inconsistency is confusing when deciding on the status of the device in our law. In the case of 
South African Human Rights Commission v Qwelane,457 the High Court found that the 
publication of a homophobic article and cartoon by Mr Qwelane amounted to hate speech and 
infringed the Equality Act. The Court then exercised its discretion and noted that in spite of 
the extensive list of available remedies, an order of costs and an unconditional apology, will 
                                                            
454 South African Human Rights Commission v Khumalo 2019 (1) SA 289 (GJ) at para 39. 
455 South African Human Rights Commission v Khumalo 2019 (1) SA 289 (GJ) at para 27.  
456 South African Human Rights Commission v Khumalo 2019 (1) SA 289 (GJ) at para 43. 
457 2018 (2) SA 149 (GJ).  
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be sufficient. It is submitted that the Court took a rather mild approach in this case and did 
not apply its minds to the relevant facts, namely that the LGBTQIAP+ community is 
historically disadvantaged and vulnerable in our community, the publication reached a 
number of people which could incite additional hatred towards the community, the 
publication discredited and criticised the constitution for being inclusive of all sexualities. 
Thus, as seen in previous decisions, it would have been appropriate to award damages in 
addition to ordering the respondent to issue an apology. Although unconditional apologies 
have an important role to play in achieving the goals of our equality legislation, it is still 
insufficient as a standalone remedy. 
 
5.7 Conclusion  
 
The wide range of remedies listed in section 21(2) of the Equality Act are a commendable 
and innovative step taken by the legislature to achieve justice for the victims, punish 
wrongful conduct whilst rehabilitating the perpetrator and guarantee the underlying values of 
our democracy. As illustrated above, many of the remedies previously existed in our law but 
the Equality Act blurs the boarders between the different branches of law drawing on each 
and representing them in the remedies list. Further, Parliament took into account the 
subjectivity of each case and affords a great deal of discretion to the courts outside of the 
listed remedies. However, section 21(2) is not without fault. 
 
Despite these avenues, the courts have limited themselves to three remedies only whilst few 
courts have reasoned their decisions in doing such. In order to give proper effect to the 
Equality Act and achieve its objectives, the courts need to take on a more active role when 
reasoning their decisions and illustrate some exercise of their wide discretion granted by the 
Act in relation to the remedies. Furthermore, the interpretation of the remedies digresses 
slightly from that of its counterparts in other legal spheres. On the one hand, this establishes 
the originality of the Equality Courts and is in line with their wide discretion, however, this 
can also lead to operational problems due to inconsistency. It is thus submitted that Equality 







CHAPTER 6: RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
‘South Africans have no concept of time and this is also why we can’t solve poverty and 
social problems… It’s now 10 years since the fall of the Apartheid government and we cannot 




Democracy in South Africa was ushered in with the adoption of the interim and final 
Constitutions. Given South Africa’s appalling history of exclusion, oppression and 
intolerance, it is not surprising that the new democratic dispensation sought to protect the 
rights of its citizens through an entrenched Bill of Rights. One of the most important rights 
protected in the Bill of Rights is contained in section 9, namely the right to equality. In order 
to give effect to this right, Parliament passed the Equality Act which sets out a number of 
provisions aimed at eradicating unfair discrimination, hate speech and harassment while 
promoting equality.  
 
Due to South Africa’s crippling system of apartheid, the Equality Act includes a number of 
novel devices which are aimed at correcting the imbalances of the past, assisting vulnerable 
social groups and working towards the egalitarian society envisaged by the Constitution. 
Section 21 of the Equality Act is an extraordinary legislative tool consisting of an extensive 
list of remedial measures. However, its implementation has been unjustifiably limited. It is 
submitted that the introduction of the Equality Act and its devices were a laudable effort to 
drive social change by finding innovative ways to internalise equality in the hearts and minds 
of the nation, however, the failure to respond to social changes and inadequate application of 
remedial measures have lead the Equality Act and its devices to become archaic.  
 
6.2 Filling in the gap   
 
Whilst a large part of South Africa’s equality legislation needed to be guided by historical 
contextualisation, it is also necessary for the legislation to respond to social changes so as not 
to create an issue of reverse inequality, thus perpetuating an inescapable cycle. As previously 
stated, the Equality Act was drafted under severe time constraints which resulted in the Act 
being rather inelegant. Since its inception 20 years ago, the Act has only seen minor revisions 
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but no efforts have been made to correct the bigger problems. Not only does the Equality Act 
violate the egalitarian views of the Constitution, it also lacks any indication of an intention by 
Parliament to reconcile the Equality Act with such views. It is submitted that such 
nonchalance is an affront to South Africa’s democracy and thus it is necessary for Parliament 
to revisit the Act to fill in the gaps. A thorough revision of the Equality Act should be 
conducted in order to facilitate a move towards a more egalitarian society. Such can be 
achieved through measures such as the inclusion of all identified groups of the LGBTQIAP+ 
community under the protection of the Act, a more open approach to issues of gender 
inequality and a greater sensitivity to issues of race.  
 
Apart from the obvious shortfall in the operation of the Act, Parliament also fell short in the 
administration of the Equality Act. In drafting the Act and its aims, Parliament failed to 
include defined targets and timeframes against which the efficacy of the Act can be 
measured. It is submitted that in order to address this the Act needs to identify specific goals 
against distinct timeframes taking into account that a transition to true equality involves 
changes the hearts and minds of society which takes years and a number of additional 
resources.458 In carrying out the latter it is important to mention that Equality Courts will play 
a vital role but cannot be viewed as the sole means.  
 
6.3 Equality Courts and their functioning  
 
In order for the Equality Act to have a meaningful impact in our society, its goals must be 
pursued proactively by both the legislature and the courts. The Equality Courts were an 
innovative tool devised by the Act to drive social change. Over the past two decades the 
establishment and functioning of the Equality Courts has seen impressive and steady 
improvement. However, the concern still remains that if the purpose of the Equality Act was 
actually being fulfilled through the operation of the Equality Courts, the number of cases 
reported would be decreasing and thus the operation of the Equality Courts would also 
diminish. When faced with this problem, one must consider the manner in which the Equality 
Courts operate. Whilst the Equality Courts exist as necessary judicial structures, their 
                                                            
458 In his article, Hepple identified five generations of legislation used by Britain in order to transition from an 
intolerant society to one based on liberation and equality. Although one cannot simply deploy equality measures 
between countries as equality legislation is not a one size fits all, it is submitted that the time periods and interim 
measures taken by Britain could inform the transformation of South Africa’s Equality Act (see B Hepple ‘The 
New Single Equality Act in Britain’ (2010) 5 The Equal Rights Review 11). 
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existence alone cannot hinder prohibited conduct. In carrying out their duties, Equality Courts 
are tasked with identifying and applying the most relevant remedies in order to uphold the 
purpose of the Act. Thus the issue of achieving the Equality Act’s purpose does not lie 
directly in the operation of the Equality Courts but rather the usage of relevant remedies as 
created under the Act.  
 
6.4 The usage of remedies  
 
The Equality Act has been described as an innovative piece of legislation which created a 
number of devices to assist it in reaching its objectives. One such device was the extensive 
list of remedies granted to the Equality Courts. As previously illustrated, despite this 
extensive list of remedies, Equality Courts tend to hover between three distinct remedies, 
namely interdicts, damage and unconditional apologies. The Equality Court’s implementation 
of select remedies have not been sufficiently justified and may be regarded as inappropriate 
as the disuse of the other remedies illustrates a failure on the part of the Equality Courts to 
exercise their discretion and creativity as encouraged under the Act.  
 
As previously discussed the remedies enjoy wide legal accommodation, but there does exist a 
discrepancy in the operation of the remedies between the different legal realms.459 Whilst it 
can be argued that different branches of the law have different purposes and thus the different 
treatment of these remedies is not surprising, it is submitted that problems can arise when 
interpreting the role of a particular remedy in South African law. It is also submitted that 
given their long existence, the usage of remedies in other legal realms should be given greater 
emphasis in shaping the approach to the Equality Act remedies. Further, by developing an 
understanding and appreciation of the section 21 remedies, Equality Courts will be more 
confident in their appropriate usage. This is central to achieve not only the overarching 





                                                            
459 For example, unconditional apologies act as mere mitigating factors in delict but under our equality 
legislation it is accepted as being a full and favourable remedy.  
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6.5 Conclusion  
 
At its inception, the Equality Act was a necessary and impressive piece of legislation which 
illustrated a step in the right direction for a country emerging out of decades of intolerance 
and inequality. Since then, however, the Act has failed to keep to date with social changes 
and maintain its prestige in our law. Whilst the provisions of the Act do need to be revised, 
more importantly, in order to achieve the goals of the Act, the devices of the Act, specifically 
the remedies of the Equality Courts, need to be actively effected. The extensive list of 
remedies has withstood the past two decades and remains an innovative but severely under 
utilised tool. Furthermore, Equality Courts should be more creative when implementing 
section 21 as it has great potential in relation to achieving the purposes of the Act. The 
revision of the Equality Act together with the commitment of the Equality Courts in 
exercising and properly articulating their section 21 discretion can steadily achieve the 
purpose of the Equality Act without straying from the egalitarian values highlighted by our 
Constitution.460 
  
                                                            
460 See also A Smith ‘Equality constitutional adjudication in South Africa’ (2014) 14 African Human Rights 
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